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Abstract 
We offer a new perspective on why initial public offerings (IPOs) occur in waves and propose 
that the customer-supplier relationships among industries help propagate IPO waves. Our 
empirical tests provide evidence that demand shocks increase the number of IPOs in an industry. 
The shocks then spread upstream through customer relationships leading to an increase in the 
number of IPOs in more central and connected industries. These findings contribute to the IPO 
literature by demonstrating the channel through which IPO waves propagate. 
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1. Introduction 
A key stylized fact in corporate finance is that initial public offerings (IPOs) vary over 
time in a wave-like fashion. The literature has put forward a number of theories to explain this 
phenomenon (Lerner, 1994; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). However, these explanations 
typically lack a clear mechanism through which the IPO waves propagate across industries. This 
is important since waves are generally not localized to a single industry, but cluster across a set 
of industries. We fill this gap in the literature by proposing that the supplier and customer 
linkages provide a path through which IPO waves can propagate.  
In fact, the industries within an economy do not function independently. They are linked 
through a network of buyer-seller contracts. Jones (2011) notes the importance of these 
relationships by showing that trade between industries in the form of intermediate goods 
accounts for about half the gross output of those industries. Consequently, the customer-supplier 
relationships can transmit shocks in one industry to other industries. The larger the number of 
customer or supplier industries, that is, the more centrally located an industry is in the network, 
the greater the probability that the industry will experience the effects from the transmission of 
these shocks through the supply chain.  
According to standard production functions, output depends on capital and so, an increase 
in demand will result in an increase in the need for financing. Initial public offerings are a source 
of funding for some firms. Therefore, as an industry-wide shock to demand transmits to different 
industries, a number of firms in those industries might undertake IPOs – resulting in the spread 
of IPOs within and across industries. Since centrally located industries are more likely to feel the 
transmission effects of shocks, we hypothesize that these industries are more likely to experience 
IPO waves.  
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To test our hypothesis, we collect data on IPOs from Jay Ritter’s website. Similar to 
Chemmanur and He (2011), we define an IPO wave year as the one in which an industry has 
more IPOs than the 75th percentile of IPOs as compared to its time series. Next, we construct 
measures of industry centrality by using the input-output tables that the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis provides (Acemoglu, Akcigit and Kerr, 2015). These tables identify the flow of trade 
between the industries. We calculate the inter-industry links using Degree centrality, which 
counts the number of customers and suppliers of an industry, and Eigenvector centrality, which 
treats connections to more central industries as being more important than connections to less 
central industries.  
The summary statistics show that the IPO waves only occur in a few industries. These 
industries tend to be more central to and interconnected in the customer-supplier network. The 
formal empirical results support our hypotheses. We find that the more central industries in the 
network are more likely to experience IPO waves. In addition, a number of statistical tests, such 
as the Bayesian Information Criteria, show that the centrality measures are better at explaining 
IPO waves than most of the widely used variables in the literature, such as the market-to-book 
ratio.  
Following Bartelsman, Caballero and Lyons (1994), we investigate the effect of the 
externalities that originate from customer and supplier industries and study which of these 
relationships helps to create IPO waves. Our estimates show that customer relationships provide 
a pathway for the transmission of shocks that produce IPO waves. The positive relationship 
between network centrality and IPO waves is stronger when at least one of the customer 
industries experiences an IPO wave. We explore the time dimension of the IPO waves as well. 
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Our results show that the relationship is concave – which indicates an initial increase in the IPO 
waves of the upstream industry that is followed by a gradual decrease. 
To mitigate the concern that our industry-based centrality measures capture an array of 
industry effects, we use several empirical strategies. First, we add time-varying measures to our 
regression models such as an industry’s concentration, homogeneity, scope, information 
asymmetry, and relative share in the economy. These control variables serve an important 
purpose. The structure of an industry is fluid and a number of confounding factors could possibly 
drive our results. For example, more central industries might have a higher number of firms and 
thus be more likely to have an IPO wave. By including these independent variables, we show 
that the centrality measures matter even after controlling for these alternative explanations. 
Second, while the variables for industry characteristics control for the observed heterogeneity 
among the industries, we use industry fixed effects to control for the time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
Third, we use a difference-in-difference estimation to further establish the causal 
relationships. We exploit two natural experiments. Our first experiment uses identifiable 
deregulatory shocks (Ovtchinnikov, 2010). We find that before deregulation, regulated industries 
have fewer IPO waves than the control industries. This is consistent with the view that 
regulations act as entry barriers to the industry. However, after deregulation, the number of IPO 
waves in these industries is greater than those in the control industries. A reason might be that 
deregulation sets in motion dynamics that ultimately increase the total demand for these 
industries. The difference-in-difference estimates provide empirical evidence that supports our 
hypothesis. In the second experiment, we use an economy-wide demand shock – the 1989 Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) between the United States and Canada – to isolate the effects of demand 
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changes. The advantage of the FTA is that other macroeconomic shocks or economic policies do 
not confound it, and the agreement affected a large part of the economy. Between 1989 and 
1991, the tariff elimination significantly increased competition among firms in the product 
market and therefore was a negative demand shock for the firms in the United States (Clausing, 
2001). The difference-in-difference estimates indicate that the IPO waves and the number of 
IPOs decreased in the post-FTA period for industries with higher centrality, which supports the 
demand-based explanation for IPO waves.  
This study contributes to the literature in five ways. First, as far as we know, we are the 
first to establish a link between industry networks and IPO waves. The literature has used 
customer-supplier relationships among industries to explain mergers and acquisitions. For 
example, Ahern and Harford (2014) study the effects of industry networks on merger waves.2 
However, there are significant differences between merger waves and IPO waves. A merger is an 
investment decision; while an IPO is a financing decision.3 Despite some, albeit small, overlaps 
(e.g., the merger-motivated IPOs as described in Hovakimian and Hutton 2010), the firms 
participating in these waves are vastly different in their age, size, capital constraints, and growth 
opportunities.4  
                                                          
2A number of studies like Fee and Thomas (2004), Kale and Shahrur (2007), Shahrur (2005), 
Becker and Thomas (2010), and Bhattacharyya and Nain (2011) study the effects of mergers on 
pricing and market power within industries. 
3 The separation principle of investment and financing policies (Fama and Miller, 1972) proposes 
that these two decisions need not be related even in the presence of imperfect information and 
market frictions. Indeed, these waves occur at different stages of the business cycle as 
documented by Rau and Stouraitis (2011). Thus, we argue that firms undertake IPOs to provide 
funds for future acquisitions. 
4 For example, firms that undertake mergers tend to be older and more mature while IPOs are 
typically undertaken by younger, emerging firms. 
6 
 
 Our second contribution is the identification of the channel through which IPO waves 
propagate across industries. Since IPO waves mostly occur in times of stock market booms, the 
IPO literature tends to link IPO waves to stock market-based measures. While these measures 
have merit, such explanations cannot account for why some industries experience IPO waves 
while others do not. By focusing on the centrality of industries, we fill this gap in the literature.  
 Third, there are studies that explore the effects of various other networks on IPOs. For 
example, Pichler and Wilhelm (2001), Corwin and Schultz (2005), and Chuluun (2014) study the 
effects of an underwriter network on IPOs. We uniquely contribute to the literature by exploring 
the relationship between IPO waves and customer-supplier networks and by identifying these 
networks as the channel through which IPO waves propagate. We show that the customer 
relationship is among the most important in determining the likelihood of an industry 
experiencing IPO waves. This finding means that for financing activities, externalities from 
customers are likely to have a greater effect than those from suppliers.  
Fourth, it is not surprising that there is an industry dynamic in IPO waves. For example, 
the information spillover theories argue that an IPO by one firm reveals information not only 
about itself but also about its industry peers that results in more accurate valuations of the firms 
in that industry (see Alti, 2005). Thus, this reduction in information asymmetry creates a cascade 
of other similar firms going public. Similarly, we propose that an IPO by a firm discloses 
information about its customers and suppliers and thus helps propagate IPO waves to those 
industries. Finally, we show that network centrality is one of the most important variables in 
explaining IPO waves. Our centrality measures explain more statistical variation than most of the 
other measures in the literature that are based on the stock market. This study thus complements 
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the efforts of Butler, Keefe and Kieschnick (2014) to find the most impactful variables for IPO 
outcomes.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework that 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of our data and method. 
Section 4 describes the empirical results. Section 5 investigates the transmission of IPO waves. 
We conclude in section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Industry Networks  
A network is a web of interconnected entities (e.g., people, firms, and industries). These 
entities form the nodes of the network and interact through their links. For example, a network 
can consist of scholars as nodes and co-authorship as links. While the application of networks in 
business topics is well established in the management literature (Powell, Koput, and Smith-
Doerr, 1996; Tsai, 2001), an emerging literature in finance studies the effect of different 
networks, for example, venture capitalists (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu; 2010), CEOs (El-
Khatib, Fogel and Jandik, 2015), and industries (Ahern and Harford, 2014), on corporate 
decisions.  
Ahern and Harford (2014), who use industry networks to explain merger waves, argue 
that the industries within an economic system interact with each other as customers or suppliers 
of goods and services. In these industry networks, the flow of trade provides the links, while the 
industries are the nodes. A natural implication of this theory is that one industry can transmit its 
shocks to another industry through trade flows. Thus, the spread of major corporate activities 
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across the linked industries can occur. We expand on this argument by applying it to an IPO 
wave setting. 
If an industry experiences a positive demand shock (e.g., a technology shock or a 
regulatory shock), it responds by producing more. The production function equates the amount 
produced to a function of investments in capital and labor. Capital investments can be separated 
into two different categories: fixed investments that are less elastic to its customer-supplier 
relationships, for example, investments in fixed assets; and investments in intermediate goods. 
The increased purchase of intermediate goods passes through the customer-supplier relationships 
and becomes demand for the upstream industries.5 One industry’s need for total investments is, 
therefore, a function of the aggregate demand for the intermediate goods that it produces.  
A source of financing for some of the firms in an industry is IPOs.6 Thus, an increase in 
the number of IPOs following an increase in demand in the intermediate goods should occur to 
meet the funding requirements of the firms. Our key assertion is that a shock creates demand for 
the goods that a particular industry produces. As a number of other industries are linked to this 
industry through customer-supplier relationships, these connected industries use financings to 
build additional capacity to meet the increased demand. Essentially, the demand for intermediate 
goods in turn transfers the effects of these shocks to the entire system, which results in an IPO 
wave. Ahern and Harford (2014) use the network centrality measures to represent this exposure.  
                                                          
5 In the production function, investments in intermediate goods and investments in fixed assets can, to some extent, 
substitute for each other. These investment needs can be positively correlated – that is, an increase in the 
investments in intermediate goods might require an increase in fixed investments. For example, a firm might need to 
increase its production capacity or purchase more efficient equipment to handle the increased demand. This type of 
capital needs can be financed through the IPOs as well, leading to an IPO wave. 
6 A firm can finance its capital needs through retained earnings, debt, and stock issuances. The capital structure 
literature (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009) provides insights into the conditions under which a firm will choose to issue 
stocks. We will not discuss the conditions under which firms choose to issue equity, since our study is not about 
capital structure decisions, but rather about the firms that have decided to issue equity for the first time. However, 
for completeness, we conduct tests in unreported tables and find that our results are stronger for industries with less 
tangible assets and lower debt capacity.  
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There is another channel through which IPO waves can propagate across industries. This 
is related to the information spillover theory of Alti (2005) that proposes that a reduction in 
valuation uncertainty increases the likelihood of an IPO wave. As a firm goes through the IPO 
process, information regarding its relationship with its customers and suppliers, including 
cashflow correlations, contracts, and trade, might be revealed. This, in turn, reduces the valuation 
uncertainty of the connected firms and incentivizes them to seek opportunities to become public - 
thus fostering the conditions for an inter-industry IPO wave. Consequently, our hypothesis is: 
H1 (IPO Wave): Central industries are more likely to experience IPO waves.  
 
In principle, the direction of a lead-lag relationship, that is, whether the customer or 
supplier relationships drive these effects, is an empirical question. The economics literature 
extensively studies the transmission of externalities through the production functions of 
industries linked by customer-supplier relationships. Bartelsman, Caballero and Lyons (1994) 
find that customer relationships play an important role in the transmission of externalities when 
they use time series properties of the data. We build on these studies by arguing that intermediate 
goods account for about half the output that an industry produces (see Jones, 2011). As a result, 
if a customer industry experiences a shock, that industry is likely to transmit that shock to the 
supplier industry through purchases of intermediate goods. The firms undertake IPOs to fund 
their investment needs because of demand shocks. Therefore, we hypothesize, 
H2 (Customer Relations): Customer relationships transmit IPO waves. 
 
2.2. Alternate Stories for Industry Characteristics  
2.2.1. Market Imperfections and IPO waves 
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The literature on IPO waves has focused largely on stock market imperfections. For 
example, Ritter (1991), and Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) use the overvaluation of 
stocks to explain this phenomenon. The key argument is that a large number of IPOs occur when 
the stock market is booming and hence, the managers are likely exploiting mis-valuations. 
Consequently, the industries that the market overvalue, as measured by market-to-book ratio, are 
more likely to undergo IPO waves (for a critique of this literature see Pastor and Veronesi, 2005 
and Schultz, 2003). In our empirical tests, we account for these mis-valuations by including a 
number of control variables such as the market-to-book ratio, stock market returns, stock market 
risk, profitability, spread of AAA corporate bonds over similar maturity Treasury bonds, and an 
indicator for hot IPO periods.  
 
2.2.2. Information Asymmetry and Rational Expectations 
Our hypothesis regarding the effects of industry centrality can co-exist with the 
information asymmetry, information spillover, and rational expectations hypotheses. Our goal is 
not to establish industry centrality as the sole factor, but rather one of the most important 
facilitators of IPO waves.  
 
A) Information Asymmetry and IPO Waves 
A large set of models that attempt to explain IPO waves depend on the inherent 
information asymmetry between a private firm and its investors. The information asymmetry 
hypothesis predicts that due to the adverse selection costs associated with IPO issuance, a firm 
will only go through with an IPO process when the proceeds from the IPO will exceed all of the 
costs. Thus, IPO waves will occur when information asymmetry is lowest in the market 
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(Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig, 2005, Lowry, 2003; He, 2007). As He (2007) shows, the 
information that investment banks produce allows low quality firms to go public in periods of 
hot equity markets. This phenomenon increases the likelihood of high quality firms going public 
in more favorable valuations and thus, creating an IPO wave. So, changes in information 
asymmetry might explain IPO waves at the industry level. These studies rely on a reduction in 
stock market frictions to help lower information asymmetry and adverse selection costs. 
 
B) Information Spillover and IPO Waves 
The information spillover theories take advantage of the sequential disclosure of 
information after a firm goes public. Alti (2005) proposes that because investors cannot know the 
true value of a private firm, an IPO of a firm within a particular industry discloses more 
information about the true value of the firms within that industry. This reduces valuation 
uncertainty for other firms within the industry who are planning their own IPOs. The lowered 
information cost triggers a number of IPOs within the same industry. Our network story can 
augment the information spillover theory. Because of the cashflow correlations between 
customers and suppliers, information spillover can take place among the connected industries. As 
a firm goes through the IPO process and becomes public, it discloses valuable information about 
its business model, its cashflows, and the nature of its relationships with its customers and 
suppliers. An IPO by a firm in one industry, thus, will disclose additional information about the 
connected firms and their industries even if they are in different industries. In essence, the 
valuation uncertainty declines and therefore, there is an increase in the likelihood of inter-
industry IPO waves. 
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C) Rational Expectations Models 
In contrast to the market timing hypotheses, Pastor and Veronesi (2005) use neoclassical 
arguments to explain IPO waves. They propose that declines in expectations about future market 
returns, not necessarily the ability of the managers to time the market, can explain IPO waves.  
However, since market mis-valuations can influence variables constructed using market returns, 
their usage of these variables to empirically test their hypothesis might not sufficiently preclude 
alternate behavioral explanations. 
A number of studies have also argued that IPO waves could occur to provide better value 
maximization opportunities to the firms, such as identifying potential targets (Zingales, 1995), 
dispersing ownership (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999), or creating an exit for the founders 
(Lerner, 1994). Chemmanur and He (2011) study IPO waves under product-market 
considerations. However, as opposed to our hypotheses, they use a theoretical setting where a 
firm uses the going public decision as a strategic move to gain product-market share from its 
private competitors. They show that even after the cost of issuance, a public firm’s cost of capital 
is lower than that of a private firm. Consequently, firms that have sufficient internal capital to 
fund their optimal investment activities decide to go public with the expectation that its 
competitors will go public. However, this drive to go public by firms during an IPO wave can 
turn out to be harmful.  
 
3. Method and Data 
Following the literature on corporate event waves, our empirical analyses are at the 
industry level (see Rau and Stouraitis, 2011).  
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3.1. Estimation Models 
We use two main types of regressions models – logit models to estimate the likelihood of 
the occurrence of IPO waves for central industries and OLS regression models when the 
dependent variable is the number of IPOs, rather than a dummy variable indicating IPO waves. 
The estimation models thus take the following form: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                    (1) 
 
The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 represents IPO waves for industry 𝑖 in year 𝑡. The 
𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 comprises industry-specific and time-varying network centrality 
measures. The set of control variables are computed for industry 𝑖 in year 𝑡 − 1. We add time 
fixed effects and industry fixed effects to control for heterogeneity. We also use robust standard 
errors.  
 
3.2. Customer-Supplier Network 
 Our centrality measures for the customer-supplier network use data from the Benchmark 
Input-Output Use Tables provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The BEA 
publishes these tables every five years. For example, we use the 1987 benchmark I-O table’s 
information to compute the centrality measures for the years 1987 to 1991. As the independent 
variables are lagged by a year in (1), the IPO waves in the years 1988 through 1992 are 
explained by the 1987 benchmark I-O table. One period’s benchmark table is mapped to the 
previous year’s by using the concordance tables provided by the BEA. We implement this 
algorithm for our entire sample period.  
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In essence, the I-O tables measure the interdependencies among industries in the 
economy. For example, for the industry pair i and j, the tables provide the value of industry i’s 
output required to produce industry j’s total output. The Input-Output tables provide the 
commodity flow information for 498 industries. The industries are defined using intermediate 
six-digit I-O industries. While the industry definitions tend to change fairly regularly, the BEA 
provides concordance tables that map previous classification schemes to current ones as well as 
the links between I-O industries and SIC codes. Notably, some of these I-O industries do not 
produce any output and some are not separately identifiable based on SIC codes.  
 
3.3. IPO Waves 
The data for IPOs are from Jay Ritter’s website for the years 1975 to 2011.7 He provides 
information on the firms undergoing an IPO process each year and their SIC industry codes. 
Since SIC codes have gone through significant revisions over the years, we use the information 
from BEA to carefully create concordance tables and map them to the I-O industries. Then, we 
identify the industries that are part of an IPO wave. There is an established literature that uses the 
75th percentile of the volume of IPOs for all years for that industry (see Chemannur and He, 
2011; Helwege and Liang, 2004; Pastor and Veronesi, 2005). Analogously, we define an IPO 
wave as occurring when an industry has more IPOs than the 75th percentile of IPOs, compared 
to its industry time series. Using the 75th percentile reduces the likelihood that the IPO wave 
variable is affected by random variations in the number of IPOs. Following, Chemannur and He 
(2011) we reduce the possibility of misclassifying small number of IPOs as an IPO wave by not 
classifying any industry-year that has four or fewer IPOs as waves. For robustness purposes, we 
                                                          
7 http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
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also use an alternate definition of IPO waves from the literature that counts the number of IPOs 
in an industry.  
Our final sample consists of I-O industries for which there is at least one IPO wave for 
our sample period. The non-IPO wave industries excluded from the sample are significantly 
different from the IPO wave industries in terms of size and profitability. Additionally, the 
excluded industries tend to be less central with very few linkages to other industries. However, in 
unreported tables, adding these industries generally increases the statistical significance of the 
results.  
Figure 1 shows that the number of IPO waves and the gross number of IPOs per year are 
highly correlated. This figure supports our classification of IPO wave industries from the 
underlying data. For instance, both the maximum number of IPOs and the maximum number of 
industries with IPO waves occur in 1996. The data underlying Figure 1 is presented in Table 1. 
Panel A reports the number of IPOs and IPO waves by year. Panel B reports the number of years 
an I-O industry experienced a wave. There are 127 industries that experienced at least one IPO 
wave over the sample period of 36 years. This finding means that less than 27% of the industries 
experience an IPO wave in our sample period. The implication is that IPO waves are restricted to 
a select group of industries. Panel C reports the top five IPO industries. The computer and data 
processing services industry had the largest number of IPOs over our sample period, followed by 
retail trade, drugs, wholesale trade, and medical instruments industries.  
In Figure 2, we plot the inter-industry customer-supplier relationships. The nodes are the 
industries while the lines represent the customer-supplier relationships. The arrows show the 
direction of the flow of goods. For example, if an industry has an arrow pointed toward it, then it 
is a customer industry. The industry that has the arrow pointed away from it is the supplier 
16 
 
industry. This graph is drawn for the “hot” IPO period between 1997 and 2000 and only contains 
industries that experienced IPO waves during the “hot” years. Three observations follow from 
this graph. First, IPO wave industries rarely exist in isolation, but are generally interconnected 
with one another. Second, as Panel A of Table 2 shows, IPO waves are concentrated among a 
few industries. Third, these relationships frequently go in both directions.  
 
3.4. Centrality Measures 
We use the industry input-output relationships to construct the standard centrality 
measures. To this end, we designate each industry as a node or an end point in the industry 
network. If two industries have a customer-supplier relationship, then there will be a connection 
between the two nodes. However, not all industries are connected to each other. Some are 
connected to a significant number of other industries, while others are isolated or self-sufficient. 
Studies have used a number of centrality measures. For brevity we report the results of the two 
most common (see Hochberg, Ljungquist, and Lu 2010) – Degree and Eigenvector. Our results 
are robust to the usage of other centrality measures, such as Closeness and Betweenness.  
Our first measure Degree is a local measure of centrality and indicates the importance of 
a particular industry to the whole ecosystem. This measure counts the number of ties a node has, 
divided by the number of possible connections. The connections measured in Degree could be in 
both directions (i.e., both as suppliers and as customers). Panel A of Table 2 shows that the IPO 
wave industries, on average, have higher values of Degree than non-IPO wave industries. We 
also provide the average centrality for IPO wave and non-IPO wave industries for each calendar 
year in Figure 3. We observe that in almost all years, the IPO wave industries have a higher 
average Degree than non-IPO wave industries.  
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 The second measure of centrality is Eigenvector. The Eigenvector gives greater weight to 
a node that is connected to other central nodes. In other words, an important industry that is 
connected to other important industries will have a greater Eigenvector value. Thus, higher 
Eigenvector values identify leaders in the network. However, since this measure gives greater 
importance to other high scoring nodes, it might ignore smaller more distant network 
connections. Panel A of Table 2 shows that the difference between the Eigenvector for average 
IPO wave industries and that for average non-IPO wave industries is 0.1835 and is statistically 
significant.  
 The correlation of the values across the different benchmark I-O tables is high. For 
example, the correlation between Degree in 1982 and 1992 is 89%. Similarly, the Eigenvectors 
have a correlation of 90%. We know that the market share of firms within an industry change 
significantly over time. Chemmanur and He (2011) find that after an IPO wave the product-
market share of the IPO firms increase sharply while that of the private firms decline. However, 
the industry information in the I-O tables contains both public and private firms. Hence, the 
industry connections measured by I-O tables remain fairly stable over time. 
 Our data on industry characteristics are from CRSP and Compustat. We map the SIC 
codes to I-O industry codes and compute our variables of interest. To test our hypotheses, we 
calculate the dependent variable IPOwave. The IPOwave is an indicator variable equal to one 
that signifies an IPO wave in the I-O industry, and is zero otherwise. The average value of 
IPOwave, as reported in Panel C of Table 2, is 0.07 that indicates 7% of the industry-year 
observations have an IPO wave. The average number of IPOs, as represented by the variable 
IPOnum, is 1.91 that indicates on average that there are approximately two IPOs per year per 
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industry. This amount might appear low but a large number of industries do not have an IPO in 
some years.  
 
3.5. Costs of Capital and Other Control Variables 
 In the IPO literature, the direct and indirect costs of capital have played a prominent role 
in explaining IPO waves. As control variables, in all of our regressions we add FF4F Alpha, the 
one-year lagged four-factor Fama-French intercept (Fama and Miller, 1972) of the IPO industry; 
and Sretx, the volatility in the returns one year before the IPO. They capture the pricing errors 
and return volatility of the firms in an industry (Pastor and Veronesi, 2005). The summary 
statistics on these variables are reported in Panel B of Table 2. The value of FF4F Alpha is 
positive and is consistent with those reported in the literature. A number of studies use the 
market-to-book ratio to measure the mispricing of an equity (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). So, we 
add MB, the median market-to-book ratio of the industry one year before the IPO, as an 
independent variable in all of our regression models. We also add Hot, a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one for the years 1997 to 2000, to capture the period related to the internet 
boom that saw an unusually high demand for and high underpricing of IPOs (see Ritter and 
Welch, 2002). The AAA-10yr is the spread between the AAA-rated corporate bond and the 
constant maturity ten-year Treasury. This variable is obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Bank (https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/). This spread captures the macroeconomic liquidity. 
During periods of higher macroeconomic liquidity, the cost of capital is lower and the stock 
market is more likely to boom. It also captures the corporate credit risk environment. A 
narrowing of the spread implies that the market is factoring in lower risk due possibly to the 
improving outlook for corporations. 
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We use Compustat to construct the other control variables. The Profit is the median 
profitability of the industry one year before the IPO. The Leverage, calculated as the median 
leverage of the industry one year before the IPO, reflects the capital structure of the firms in the 
industry. The Tang reflects the asset composition of the average firm in a particular industry. It is 
calculated as the median tangibility of assets in the industry one year before the IPO. Investment 
on capital goods is captured by Capx, which is defined as the median CAPX/AT of the industry 
one year before the IPO. Further, to capture the asset size of the firms in the industry, we 
compute Size as the median of the natural logarithm of the total assets of the firms in the industry 
one year before the IPO. The Mkt-rf is the market return minus the risk-free rate. This variable is 
computed using data from Kenneth French’s website and represents the equity risk premium. 
The Stock Vol is the average of the standard deviation in the stock returns of all firms in a 
particular industry. The standard deviations are initially calculated using monthly data. The GDP 
Growth is the year over year percentage change in the real per capita GDP. Similarly, Invest 
Growth is the year over year percentage change in real private nonresidential fixed investment. 
The GDP Growth and Investment Growth variables follow Lowry (2003) and capture the 
macroeconomic conditions of the country. 
We also use proxies for information asymmetry that follow Lowry (2003). The Earn AR 
Disp is the standard deviation in the abnormal stock returns around earnings announcements (one 
day prior to the announcement to one day after the announcement) in the last quarter of the fiscal 
year for the corporation. The Analyst Disp is the average of the standard deviation in the 
analysts’ recommendations on earnings per share. This is also calculated for the 
recommendations in the last quarter of the fiscal year of the firm. The data are obtained from the 
IBES database. 
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The summary statistics for these variables are presented in Panel C of Table 2. They are 
consistent with those reported in the literature. In addition to these common control variables, we 
use other independent variables wherever necessary. For example, we add year dummy variables 
to capture the effects of business cycles.  
 
3.6. Industry Characteristics Controls 
 To account for industry heterogeneity and to ensure that the coefficient estimates of the 
centrality measures are not driven by changes in the industry characteristics, we control for the 
industry’s concentration, homogeneity, scope, and relative share in the economy. The variable 
Herfindahl is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index that is calculated by using the relative sales of 
firms within an industry. Higher values indicate higher concentration. It approaches zero when 
there are a large number of firms of similar size and approaches one when the industry is 
controlled by a single firm. Essentially, this variable changes as either the number of firms or 
their relative size changes. Industry Homogeneity measures the extent to which the firms within 
an industry are statistically similar. We calculate this variable following Parrino (1997) as the 
partial correlation of the monthly returns of the firms in that industry on an annual basis. The 
higher the value of this variable, the more homogeneous the industry is. Industry Scope on the 
other hand takes into account the variations in the types of goods and services an industry 
produces. It is calculated following Ahern and Harford (2014) where we calculate the percent of 
all four-digit SIC codes that map to a particular IO industry.  
 If IPO waves are driven by investment needs, as we argue, then the share of an industry 
in the economy and the number of firms in that industry should increase following demand 
shocks. To ensure that our results are not driven by this issue and that the centrality measures 
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matter even after controlling for the share of an industry in the economy, we add two controls for 
the relative size of the industry in the economy – Firms in Ind and Sales Ind. The Firms in Ind is 
the number of firms in the industry in a particular year divided by the total number of firms for 
that year. The Sales Ind is the dollar sales of the industry in a year divided by the dollar value of 
the sales by all companies for that year.8 The summary statistics are presented in Panel B of 
Table 2. 
 These variables control for the observable heterogeneity among the industries. To 
account for unobservable heterogeneity, we use the industry fixed effects in our regression 
models. Additionally, we use two sets of natural experiments where we take advantage of the 
difference-in-difference method.  
 
4. Industry Network Centrality and IPO Waves  
 We begin our empirical analyses by exploring the link between the centrality measures 
and the likelihood of the occurrence of IPO waves as stated in our first hypothesis. The 
regression estimates are presented in Panel A of Table 3. In columns (1) and (2) we use a logit 
regression model where the dependent variable is IPOWave. We add Degree and Eigenvector 
one at a time since they are highly correlated with each other. If the centrality of an industry in 
                                                          
8 Ideally, to formulate measures of an industry’s share of the overall economy, we would require data on private 
firms, as these are the ones that can potentially go public. The Census Bureau 
(https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/econ/susb/susb-historical.html) provides data on the total number of 
firms in the United States since 1986. However, the individual industry break-downs, that is, the number of firms 
per industry, are available only since 1997. Incorporating this variable in our regressions will substantially shrink 
our sample and make it impossible for us to conduct some of the important robustness tests. The Census Bureau 
does provide the number of establishments (establishments are the different locations from which the firm operates) 
per industry from 1986 (https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/data/datasets.html). However, using the 
number of establishments can be misleading as a firm is likely to have many establishments. Also, the number of 
establishments change very regularly because of business dynamism (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2010) and so is 
an inaccurate proxy for the number of firms in an industry. The finance literature, thus, commonly uses the 
Compustat database of public firms as a proxy for the entire industry consisting of both public and private firms (for 
a recent example, see Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely, 2016).  
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the system is indeed important, we expect to observe positive and statistically significant 
coefficients for the centrality measures. For both centrality measures, we observe positive 
coefficients and they are statistically significant at the 1% level. These estimates supports our 
first hypothesis that central industries are more likely to experience an IPO wave. The 
coefficients are economically significant as well. A 1% increase in Degree increases the 
probability of observing an IPO wave by about 2.1%. Similarly, a 1% increase in Eigenvector 
increases the probability of an IPO wave by about 2.5%. Industry centrality therefore plays an 
important role in IPO waves. 
Among the other control variables, capital expenditure is positive and statistically 
significant. This finding indicates that industries with higher capital expenditure are more likely 
to have an IPO wave. Additionally, industry scope has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient estimate. This finding means that industries that produce a diverse set of outputs are 
more likely to experience IPO waves. 
The dummy variable IPOwave in columns (1) and (2) might not capture the depth of the 
IPO waves. As such, we construct an alternate definition of IPO waves where we enter the 
number of IPOs, IPOnum, as the dependent variable. This definition is widely used in the IPO 
literature (e.g., see Pastor and Veronesi, 2005). The results are in columns (3) and (4). For each 
of the centrality measures, we observe positive coefficients that are statistically significant at the 
1% level. This finding provides further support for the argument that central industries are more 
likely to experience an IPO wave.  
As a further robustness check, we re-estimate our basic regression models with the Cox 
proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972). In discrete outcome models, such as logit regressions, 
the timing of the events, in our case IPO issuance, is not explicitly incorporated. Hazard models 
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do that and thus, use the data more efficiently. In our Cox proportional hazard model, we define 
a private firm going through the IPO process in an IPO wave year as the survival event. The 
model will thus estimate the probability of a private firm participating in an IPO wave. 
Therefore, the hazard rate is the instantaneous rate of exit through an IPO for a firm that has not 
done it yet. The Cox model is semiparametric and does not make any assumption about the 
nature or shape of the hazard function. More importantly, it takes into account the fact that not 
all industries must go through an IPO wave – other possibilities exist for these industries.  
 In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is IPOwave. The coefficients support our 
original conclusions regarding the relationship between industry centrality and the likelihood of 
IPO wave. All coefficients are positive and statistically significant. Thus, these results support 
our claim that the industry-customer relationship propagates the positive relationship between 
industry centrality and the likelihood of an IPO wave.  
To ascertain the marginal significance of the various factors in explaining IPO waves, we 
calculate and present four sets of statistics – odds ratio, z-statistics, Wald Chi,2 and Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC). These statistics indicate whether the inclusion of a particular factor 
improves the empirical model and if so, by how much. Higher values of the odds ratio, z-
statistic, and Wald Chi2 mean that a particular explanatory variable has greater influence. But, 
when choosing a model, the one with the lowest BIC is better. The results are presented in Panel 
B of Table 3. We concentrate on the difference between centrality measures (Degree and 
Eigenvector) and the market based factors (FF4F Alpha, MB, and Hot). Across all four tests, the 
centrality measures perform better than all of the market factors. Therefore, the centrality 
measures explain IPO waves as well as, if not better than, a number of the widely used stock 
market based indicators. 
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4.1. Robustness – The Non-“Hot” Years 
 In U.S. economic history, the late 1990s are somewhat exceptional. This period is 
characterized by a significant expansion of listed firms, especially in the technology sector. For 
example, the increase in internet usage in the later part of the decade (the “Hot” years were from 
1997 to 2000) saw a jump in technology related firms going public. Firms that had customer-
supplier relationships with these internet-based firms, for example, computer equipment 
manufacturers, content providers, cable companies, and customer relation management software 
companies, saw an increase in demand, had large capital needs, grew quickly, and went through 
the IPO process. Thus, the observations from this period might have an outsized effect on our 
results.  
Therefore, we examine whether the relationship between industry centrality and IPO 
waves holds outside of this period. Two possible options exists for this examination: add an 
interaction term for the “Hot” years and the centrality measures in the regressions; or drop the 
observations from the “Hot” years from 1997 to 2000 and re-estimate the regression models. We 
have replicated the results in both ways. For brevity, we only report the results from dropping the 
“Hot” years in Table 4. It is possible that the relationship between IPOs and a number of these 
independent variables might be different during the “Hot” years and so, reporting the results 
without the “Hot” years might reflect the underlying relationships more accurately. We find that 
our results hold for the strictly non-“Hot” years. Compared to Panel A of Table 3, the 
coefficients for Degree and Eigenvector in Table 4 are slightly smaller, but they remain positive 
and statistically significant in all cases. Thus, the effects of centrality on IPO waves persist 
outside of the internet period. 
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4.2. Positive Demand Shock – Deregulated Industries  
So far we have investigated the relationship between IPO waves and the industry’s 
centrality measures. To generate our hypothesis, we argue that these customer-supplier 
relationships transmit shocks. It follows that we should explore these shocks to get a better 
understanding of the process. We concentrate on deregulatory shocks since deregulation is a 
political process and thus, is relatively exogenous to the industry. In general, there are two major 
theories that explain the effect of deregulation – public interest and University of Chicago 
theories. As argued in Noll (1989), the public interest theory states that deregulation should 
improve efficiencies that benefit the consumers as industries are deregulated to benefit the 
public. The Chicago theory was developed by Peltzman (1976). It argues that deregulation 
should increase social welfare because the deadweight costs that are associated with the rent-
seeking of certain groups that benefit from regulation should dissipate under competition. Both 
of these theories suggest that increased competition due to deregulation should remove the 
inefficient firms and the inefficiencies from the surviving firms – ultimately benefiting the 
consumers. As the consumers’ benefits increase, the industry’s total demand should also 
increase.    
We obtain a list of deregulatory shocks from Ovtchinnikov (2010). There are a total of 25 
shocks. When industries experience multiple shocks, the second shock occurs after at least five 
years the first shock. We choose a difference-in-difference estimation since it has the advantage 
of removing unobserved industry fixed effects and is largely free from endogeneity concerns.   
 To conduct the difference-in-difference estimation, we construct two sets of treated and 
control groups – one based on Degree and the other on Eigenvector. For the first set, the treated 
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group consists of industries that have experienced shocks and have a Degree with a value larger 
than the 75th percentile. The control group also experiences shocks and is similar to the treated 
group in size, year, and profitability. Essentially, the treated and control groups are different in 
their industry Degree centralities. We create a dummy variable HighDegree that takes the value 
of one if the industry belongs in the treated group and zero if it belongs in the control group. 
Similarly, for the second set, we repeat the previous process, except instead of Degree, we take 
the Eigenvector values. We generate another dummy variable HighEigen that takes the value of 
one if the industry belongs in this treated group and zero if it belongs in this control group. For 
the difference-in-difference estimation, we use the industry data for five years before and five 
years after the industry shocks. 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the summary statistics of these treated and control groups. 
Before deregulation, the treated groups have statistically fewer IPOs and IPO waves than the 
control groups. For instance, 2.1% of the control industries experience an IPO wave while only 
1.2% of the treated industries experience an IPO wave. After deregulation, the number of IPOs 
and IPO waves of both the control and treated groups increase with the treated group having a 
larger increase. This increase supports the view that regulations act as entry barrier to an 
industry. Deregulations set in motion industry dynamics that make it attractive for firms to enter. 
Importantly, after the deregulatory shocks, the relationship reverses and the treated groups have 
more IPOs and IPO waves. The post-deregulation difference between the treated and control 
groups is economically significant as 4.5% more treated industries undergo an IPO wave than the 
industries from the control group. Column (7) reports that the differences between column (6) 
and (3) are statistically significant in every row of the table.  
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 The indicator variable Shock takes the value of one if the observations are from the year 
after the industry shock and zero otherwise. Our final sample shows that the calendar years of 
some of the control observations do not coincide with those of the treated observations. This is 
mainly because of the fact that industry shocks are spread out over many years. This spread 
could create a situation where the control group might not be able to remove the time trends. 
Roberts and Whited (2012) suggest a method to check for such a bias through a paired t-test of 
the growth rates of the key dependent variables in the control group and the treated group for the 
pre-shock years. In unreported results, we find that the growth rates of the number of IPOs in the 
pre-shock years are statistically insignificant between the two groups. This means that the trends 
are similar for the treated and control groups in the pre-shock years. For robustness, we adopt 
another way to control for time trends by including the year dummies as independent variables. 
We do so in all regressions.  
Panel B of Table 5 reports the regression results. The dependent variables are IPOWave 
in columns (1) and (2) and IPOnum in columns (3) and (4). The coefficients for the interaction 
term of HighDegree and Shock are positive and statistically significant in all of the regression 
estimates. This suggests that highly connected industries are more likely to experience an IPO 
wave and have a higher number of IPOs following an industry deregulatory shock. These results 
from the difference-in-difference estimation support our first hypothesis.   
 
4.3. Downstream Shocks and Upstream IPO Waves 
 We next use the deregulatory shocks and the difference-in-difference method to explore 
how the shocks propagate through the industry network. Specifically, we study whether the 
shocks travel upstream from downstream industries or vice versa. To conduct this analysis for 
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each industry, we create an indicator variable IPOWave1 that takes the value of one if any of its 
upstream industries experience an IPO wave. Similarly, IPOnum1 counts the number of IPOs 
upstream industries experience. We replicate the regression equations presented in Table 5 with 
these two newly defined variables. We find that the interaction terms HighDegree * Shock and 
HighEigen * Shock are both positive and statistically significant in all cases. Furthermore, the 
Chi2/Adjusted R2 are higher for the estimates presented in Table 6 than those in Table 5. These 
regression estimates provide evidence that downstream demand shocks lead to IPO waves in 
upstream industries. This finding supports our second hypothesis that if a customer industry 
experiences a shock, it is likely to be transmitted to the supplier industry through a shift in 
demand for intermediate goods.  
For completeness, we also perform a similar analysis to study whether shocks to 
upstream industries lead to IPO waves in downstream industries. We find that the interaction 
terms HighDegree * Shock and HighEigen * Shock are statistically insignificant in all instances. 
For the sake of brevity, we do not present these estimates here.  
 
4.4. Negative Demand Shock -- Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of 1989 
 If, as we argue, positive demand shocks result in subsequent IPO waves, then does a 
negative demand shock result in a decrease in IPO waves? We use a natural experiment that 
involves a free trade agreement (FTA), which turned out to be a negative demand shock for U.S. 
firms, and explore whether it depressed IPO waves in the more central industries. In the FTA 
agreement that Canada and the United States implemented in 1989, both countries agreed to 
eliminate tariffs. This agreement was important as the Canada-United States trade relationship 
was the largest in the world at that time and accounted for 20% of the imports into the United 
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States. Clausing (2001) credits the FTA with substantially increasing Canadian exports into the 
United States.   
Tariff elimination generally reduces the price of goods for the consumers and so, is 
welfare enhancing. However, it might hurt the industries that the tariffs protected. The literature 
finds that tariff reduction leads to plant shutdowns (Trefler, 2004), lower profit margins (Krishna 
and Mitra, 1998), and higher unemployment (Beaulieu, 2000). As Canada also agreed to 
eliminate tariffs, the benefits of the agreement should also flow to the U.S. firms that are in a 
position to export to Canada. However, Bernard and Jensen (2004) find that only a select set of 
U.S. firms export to Canada because of substantial sunk costs, and these firms tend to be large. 
Therefore, the implementation of the FTA is a negative demand shock because of increased 
product-market competition (Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010).  
The FTA of 1989 has several advantages (see Trefler (2004) for an in-depth discussion). 
First, the adoption of the FTA was unexpected and so, was not accompanied by any confounding 
macroeconomic shocks. When the initial details of the FTA were released in 1987, the reaction 
from the Canadian public was negative. The opposition party would not allow the passage of the 
bill through the parliament and thus, the approval of the FTA was deferred until after the general 
elections in late 1988. In pre-election polling, the opposition party had an advantage. However, 
the incumbent government was able to win a closely fought election in which one of the key 
issues was the FTA.  
Second, this negative demand shock for the U.S. firms was accompanied by a rising stock 
market. A large part of the tariff eliminations took place between 1989 and 1991, while the S&P 
500 stock index rose almost 50% from 277.72 to 417.03. Moreover, the stock market 
experienced the crash of 1987 about 15 months before the implementation of the FTA. 
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Therefore, for the purpose of our study, this timing allows us to isolate the effects of the demand 
shock from those of the stock market returns.  
To formulate the treated group, we select all industries that have a Degree with a value 
larger than the 75th percentile. We use all industries because the FTA was an economy-wide 
shock (Guadalupe and Wulf, 2009; Clausing, 2001). It removed tariffs on all industries and not 
just some targeted industries. We then select the control group to be industries that are similar to 
the treated group in size, year, and profitability. We create a dummy variable HighDegree1 that 
takes the value of one if the industry belongs in the treated group and zero if it belongs in the 
control group. We repeat the same process with Eigenvector and generate the dummy variable 
HighEigen1. Next we create another indicator variable called Post-FTA. It takes the value of one 
if the observations are from three years after the FTA was implemented, and zero for the ones 
from three years before.  
Panel A of Table 7 presents the summary statistics of these treated and control groups. 
Before the FTA, column (3) shows that the treated and control groups were not statistically 
different. After the implementation of the FTA, the IPOs and the IPO waves were lower for the 
high centrality group. The relationship is exactly the opposite of what we observed in Panel A of 
Table 5 that describes the effects of positive demand shocks due to deregulation. 
Panel B of Table 7 shows the results of regressing IPOWave and IPOnum on Post-FTA 
and its interaction with HighDegree1 and HighEigen1. Columns (1) and (2) show that the 
coefficients for the interaction terms HighDegree1 * Post-FTA and HighEigen1 * Post-FTA are 
both negative and statistically significant. This result indicates that during the three years after 
1989, there was a decline in IPO waves as compared to the three years preceding 1989 for highly 
central industries. Similarly, columns (3) and (4) report the estimates of the interaction terms of 
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Post-FTA and centrality measures using IPOnum as the dependent variable. The coefficients for 
the interaction terms HighDegree1 * Post-FTA and HighEigen1 * Post-FTA are also negative 
and statistically significant. This result provides evidence that there were fewer IPOs in the three 
years following the FTA as compared to the three years before for the highly central industries. 
These results support our argument that the central industries are more likely to be affected by an 
economy-wide demand shock, whether it is positive or negative.  
However, due to greater overall competition in the product market following the FTA, 
the prices of intermediate goods might have decreased. If this decrease was the case, we should 
see a greater occurrence of IPO waves (i.e., positive coefficient estimates for the interaction 
terms between Post-FTA and the centrality measures). However, we find the opposite results. 
 
5. Customer Relationships and Industry Centrality 
5.1 Customer or Supplier with an IPO Wave 
We now turn to our second hypothesis on understanding the mechanism that propagates 
IPO waves across industry networks. We produce four sets of regression outputs in four different 
panels in Table 8. In Panel A of Table 8, we explore whether an industry whose customers are 
experiencing IPO waves undergoes an IPO wave. In Panel B, we repeat this analysis for the 
industry whose suppliers are experiencing IPO waves. In Panel C, we only consider the 
industries whose customers go through IPO waves. Then, we split the sample into high and low 
centrality groups to understand which type of industries is most affected. In Panel D, we repeat 
this analysis for industries whose suppliers go through IPO waves. For brevity, we only present 
the results for Degree. 
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In the first two columns of Panel A, the dependent variable is IPOwave; and in the last 
two, it is IPOnum. Columns (1) and (3) have the observations for industries whose customers 
experience IPO waves, while columns (2) and (4) have those whose customers do not. The 
coefficients for Degree are statistically significant and positive for industries whose customers 
go through IPO waves. On the other hand, the coefficients are statistically insignificant for 
industries whose customers do not go through an IPO wave. The results indicate that the 
likelihood of an industry undergoing an IPO wave increases with centrality if at least one of its 
customers experiences an IPO wave. No such statistically significant relationship exists for 
industries without a customer undergoing an IPO wave. 
Similar to the first panel, in the first two columns of Panel B, the dependent variable is 
IPOwave; and in the last two, it is IPOnum. Columns (1) and (3) have the observations for 
industries with at least one supplier that experiences an IPO wave, while columns (2) and (4) 
have those that do not. The coefficients for Degree are statistically significant and positive in all 
cases, regardless of whether the suppliers go through IPO waves or not. The coefficients in 
columns (1) and (2) are very similar as well. We conduct a Wald test to compare the coefficients 
for Degree and find that the Chi2 value is 0.82, which is statistically insignificant at the 10% p-
value level. Similarly, the coefficients for Degree in columns (3) and (4) are statistically similar 
(Chi2 =1.17, p-value > 10%). Therefore, there does not appear to be any statistically significant 
difference in the relationship between an IPO wave and network centrality if we sort the 
industries based on whether their suppliers are going through an IPO wave or not.  We next 
consider only industries whose customers experience IPO waves. We split the sample in half 
based on the median value of Degree. Columns (1) and (3) of Panel C have the industries whose 
Degree is higher than the median, while columns (2) and (4) have those whose Degree is lower 
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than the median. As before, in the first two columns, the dependent variable is IPOwave; and in 
the last two, it is IPOnum. The coefficients for Degree are statistically significant and positive 
for industries whose centralities are higher than the median. On the other hand, the coefficients 
are statistically insignificant for industries whose centralities are lower than the median. These 
coefficients provide evidence that the positive relationship between IPO waves and centrality is 
mainly present among the more central industries. 
Further, for the sake of completeness, we take only industries whose suppliers experience 
IPO waves. We split the sample in half, based on the median value of Degree. As in the previous 
panel, columns (1) and (3) of Panel D have the industries whose Degree centralities are higher 
than the median, while columns (2) and (4) have those whose centralities are lower than the 
median. Similarly, in the first two columns of Panel C, the dependent variable is IPOwave; and 
in the last two, it is IPOnum. The coefficients for Degree are statistically insignificant in the first 
two columns. Therefore, there does not appear to be any difference among the industries based 
on this sorting scheme. However, when it comes to IPOnum as the dependent variable, the 
relationship between IPOnum and Degree is positive but statistically insignificant for more 
central industries, but negative and statistically significant for less central industries. While the 
results are somewhat mixed in this case, we can claim that industries whose suppliers are 
experiencing IPO waves are no more likely to experience an IPO wave than those industries that 
are not. 
In summary, the four sets of tests presented here provide empirical evidence on how 
industry centrality influences the ecosystem. The customer-supplier relationship appears to be 
the channel that spreads an IPO wave from one industry to others.  
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5.2. Intertemporal Characteristics of IPO Waves 
In this study, we propose that IPO waves start among industries following a shock and 
then the customer-supplier relationships propagate these waves upstream. There is an important 
time dimension to this proposition. We use Chemmanur and He (2011) to explore this 
dimension. We build on the results in Table 8 that show that IPO waves start with a downstream 
industry experiencing an IPO wave and then transmit to more central upstream industries. 
Therefore, we only take those industries whose customer industries experience an IPO wave and 
split them into two groups based on Degree centrality. Next, we construct a new variable Time 
that counts the number of years since an IPO wave was experienced by the customer industry. 
Additionally, the relationship between IPO waves and Time should be nonlinear and concave – 
we should observe an increase in IPOs in the upstream industries that should eventually die 
down. If we find a linear or a convex relationship between IPO waves and Time, there should be 
continuous and permanent IPO waves. To capture any nonlinearity, we add both the linear 
variable Time and the quadratic variable Time2 as independent variables. A statistically 
significant and positive coefficient for Time and a statistically significant and negative 
coefficient for Time2 should indicate a concave relationship. This is exactly what we find for the 
group of more central industries in the estimates presented in Table 9. Both coefficient estimates 
for Time and Time2 are statistically insignificant for the group of industries that are less central. 
Our results show that the propagation of IPO waves has two intertemporal characteristics – first, 
the shocks travel to upstream industries after a shock to the downstream industries and second, 
the relationship is concave in nature – which indicates an initial increase in the IPO waves, 
followed by a decline. 
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6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we propose a new explanation for IPO waves that is rooted in real 
economics: customer-supplier relationships. Prior literature observes that industries within an 
economy cannot function in isolation. They are interconnected through a complex set of ties. The 
customer-supplier relationship is one such connection. The demand from one industry can 
transmit to another through these interdependencies. The literature also demonstrates that IPOs 
occur in a wave-like fashion. Because IPO waves are likely to create a significant ripple in the 
industries undergoing these events, other industries connected to these industries are also likely 
to feel the effect of these events.  
 To develop a better understanding of the relationship between industry networks and IPO 
waves, we construct a number of industry centrality measures and conduct formal regression 
analyses. We find that more central industries are more likely to experience an IPO wave. Next 
we explore the channel through which these IPO waves propagate through the economic system 
– specifically, we consider the customer-supplier relationships. We find that the positive 
relationship between network centrality and IPO waves is stronger for industries that have at 
least one of its customers experiencing an IPO wave.  
We perform detailed analyses on the consequences of industry networks on the 
propagation of IPO waves. Our results show that the long debated questions in the literature like 
underpricing, age of the firm at IPO, offer price revisions, and post-IPO performance can also be 
studied by using the customer-supplier relationships. We leave these questions for future 
research. 
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Figure 1: IPO Waves in the U.S. 
 
 
 
This graph compares the number of industries experiencing IPO waves (left vertical axis) to the 
total number of IPOs issued per year (right vertical axis) by year. We define the industry by its 
six-digit I-O categories. 
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Figure 2: Customer-Supplier Connections among IPO Wave Industries during Hot IPO 
Years (1997 to 2000) 
 
 
 
This plot shows the customer-supplier connections between industries undergoing IPO waves. 
The sample period is 1997 to 2000 (i.e., the hot years). The arrows show the direction of the flow 
of intermediate goods. So, an arrow toward an industry means that it is a customer, while the 
arrow pointing away from the industry means that it is a supplier.  
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 Figure 3: Network Centrality of Industries 
 
 
 
This graph plots the average centrality measure (Degree) of industries experiencing IPOs by 
year. Missing values indicate no IPO wave for that year. We define industry by its six-digit I-O 
categories. 
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Table 1: Panel A) Annual Number of IPOs and IPO Waves 
Year Number of IPOs 
Number of Industries 
with IPO Waves 
 (1) (2) 
1975 12 0 
1976 24 0 
1977 21 0 
1978 19 0 
1979 41 0 
1980 62 1 
1981 172 10 
1982 66 0 
1983 510 19 
1984 230 9 
1985 265 5 
1986 517 28 
1987 383 21 
1988 166 4 
1989 169 2 
1990 141 3 
1991 340 10 
1992 461 22 
1993 582 31 
1994 466 22 
1995 503 16 
1996 676 31 
1997 476 25 
1998 313 10 
1999 479 12 
2000 393 11 
2001 84 1 
2002 72 0 
2003 74 0 
2004 193 5 
2005 190 4 
2006 189 8 
2007 210 8 
2008 26 0 
2009 40 0 
2010 81 2 
2011 72 1 
Total 8718 321 
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This panel shows the number of IPOs and IPO waves by year. 
 
Panel B) IO Industries and Number of Years with IPO Waves 
Years with Waves Number of IO Industries 
(1) (2) 
1 43 
2 34 
3 26 
4 8 
5 5 
6 6 
7 2 
8 2 
9 1 
Total 127 
 
This panel categorizes the number of IO industries by the number of IPO waves they have 
experienced during the sample period. 
 
Panel C) Top 5 IPO Industries in I-O Classification 
I-O Industry 
(1) 
Industry Description 
(2) 
Number of IPOs 
(3) 
730104 Computer and data processing services 1148 
690200 Retail trade, except eating and drinking 501 
290100 Drugs 408 
690100 Wholesale trade 406 
620400 Surgical and medical instruments and apparatus 226 
 
This panel counts the number of IPOs by six-digit I-O industry codes between the period 1975 
and 2011. 
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Table 2) Summary Statistics 
Panel A) Average Alternately Computed Centrality Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 IPO Wave Non- IPO Wave (1)- (2) 
Degree 0.5807 0.3723 0.2084** 
Eigenvector 0.6727 0.4892 0.1835** 
Observations 321 4251  
 
The benchmark IO tables are produced every five years. The centrality measures are re-
computed every five years to reflect the data in the tables. For example, the data in the 1987 IO 
tables is used to compute the centrality measures for the five years from 1987 to 1991. After that 
the 1992 IO table is used for the years 1992 to 1996.  The 1997 table is used for the period 1997 
to 2001. The 2002 table is used for the years 2002 to 2006. The 2007 table is used for the years 
from 2007 to 2011. Average values are reported in columns (1) and (2), and column (3) reports 
the difference between columns (1) and (2). The ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% 
level.  
 
Panel B) Other Variables 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
IPOWave 0.0702 0.1763 
IPOnum 1.9068 5.4209 
FF4F Alpha 0.0156 1.1422 
Sretx 0.1482 0.0925 
MB 1.6262 1.8309 
Profit 0.0132 0.4406 
Leverage 0.1575 0.0944 
Tang 0.2876 0.1529 
Capx 0.1872 0.0793 
Size 4.8275 1.3702 
Herfindahl 0.3217 0.1744 
Industry Homogeneity 0.9182 1.9131 
Industry Scope 0.0029 0.0088 
AAA-10yr 1.1951 0.5063 
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Firms in Ind 0.0396 0.0141 
Sales Ind 0.0164 0.0147 
Mkt-rf 0.0178 0.0331 
Stock Vol 0.1482 0.0925 
GDP Growth 2.8674 2.1667 
Invest Growth 5.3571 7.0943 
Earn AR Disp 0.0791 0.0234 
Analyst Disp 0.0525 0.0119 
 
There are 4,572 observations. FF4F Alpha is the monthly four-factor Fama-French intercept one year before the IPO. 
Sretx is the volatility of the returns one year before the IPO. MB is the median market-to-book ratio of the industry 
one year before the IPO. Profit is the median profitability of the industry one year before the IPO. Leverage is the 
median leverage of the industry one year before the IPO. Tang is the median tangibility of assets of the industry one 
year before the IPO. Capx is the median CAPX/AT of the industry one year before the IPO. Size is the median ln(total 
assets) of the industry one year before the IPO. Herfindahl reflects the concentration of the sales of the firms in that 
industry. Industry Homogeneity is the partial correlation of the monthly returns of the firms in that industry and is 
calculated on an annual basis. The method for the calculation comes from Parrino (1997). As in Ahern and Harford 
(2014), Industry Scope is the percentage of all SICs that map to an individual IO industry. AAA-10yr is the spread of 
the constant maturity of AAA-rated corporate bonds and the 10-year Treasury bond. This data is from 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Firms_in_Ind  is the total number of firms at the end of the last calendar 
year in that industry divided by the total number of Compustat firms in that year. Sales Ind is the dollar value of the 
sales for that industry in the previous year divided by the total dollar value of sales of all firms in Compustat. Mkt-rf  
is the market return less the risk-free rate. This is the equity risk premium and uses the data from Fama-French’s 
module in WRDS. Stock Vol is the average of the standard deviation in the stock returns of all firms in that industry. 
Monthly data is used to calculate the standard deviations.  GDP Growth  is the year over year percentage change in 
the real GDP. Invest Growth is the year over year percentage change in real private nonresidential fixed investment. 
Earn AR Disp is the standard deviation in abnormal stock returns on earnings announcements (one day prior to 
announcement to one day after announcement) in the last quarter of the fiscal year for the corporation. Analyst Disp 
is the average of the standard deviation of the analysts’ recommendations about earnings per sharehe last quarter of 
the fiscal year of the corporation.  
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Table 3: Industry Network Centrality and IPO Waves 
Panel A) Regression Analysis 
Dependent variable IPOwave is an indicator variable equal to one that signifies an IPO waves for the I-O industry. 
IPOnum is the number of IPOs in an IPO wave by I-O industry. Degree is a measure of centrality. Eigenvector is a 
measure of eigenvector centrality. The rest of the variables are defined in Panel C of Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) 
use industry fixed effects in the panel logit regression, columns (3) and (4) use industry fixed effects in an OLS 
regression, and columns (5) and (6) use the Cox Hazard model. Year dummies are included in all columns. Robust 
standard errors are reported below the coefficients. VIF represents Variance Inflation Factor. The * and ** indicate 
statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var.: IPOwave IPOwave IPOnum IPOnum IPOwave IPOwave 
Degree 2.0952  6.9544  1.5388  
 (0.3828)**  (2.5261)**  (0.3657)**  
Eigenvector  2.4818  8.3442  1.8465 
  (0.4410)**  (3.1483)**  (0.4259)** 
FF4F Alpha  1.3702 1.3647 4.9376 4.8965 0.7802 0.7791 
 (0.8628) (0.8624) (5.8333) (5.8325) (1.0572) (1.0591) 
Sretx  1.2819 1.2752 1.7245 1.7712 0.6380 0.6381 
 (0.7870) (0.7855) (3.9167) (3.9162) (0.5021) (0.5005) 
MB  0.0399 0.0398 4.0781 4.1043 0.0328 0.0337 
 (0.0299) (0.0300) (0.8010)** (0.8015)** (0.0425) (0.0422) 
Profit  1.4863 1.4512 1.0736 2.9849 2.3765 2.2840 
 (1.0255) (1.0195) (5.3123) (5.3127) (1.4072) (1.4032) 
Leverage  0.2768 0.3125 0.3625 0.3311 0.7977 0.8150 
 (1.2174) (1.2167) (4.4718) (4.4701) (1.3757) (1.3790) 
Tang  -1.1120 -1.0918 -8.8066 -8.7403 -0.5733 -0.5864 
 (0.7965) (0.7942) (5.2479) (5.2486) (0.8190) (0.8205) 
Capx  4.5914 4.5793 4.1684 4.1855 3.1923 3.1970 
 (1.0645)** (1.0654)** (4.3047) (4.3042) (1.0992)** (1.1014)** 
Size  -0.0698 -0.0701 -0.1704 -0.1808 -0.0746 -0.0732 
 (0.0871) (0.0868) (0.4202) (0.4206) (0.0876) (0.0876) 
Hot  3.4139 3.3919 5.8112 5.8272 0.5746 0.5681 
 (10.4374) (10.4367) (1.8574)** (1.8574)** (1.3488) (1.3685) 
Herfindahl -0.5447 -0.5126 -2.4211 -2.4650 -0.6668 -0.6478 
 (0.2807) (0.2801) (1.0974)* (1.0973)* (0.3588) (0.3588) 
Industry 
Homogeneity 
0.0258 0.0258 0.0074 0.0074 0.0391 0.0400 
 (0.0356) (0.0359) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0673) (0.0683) 
Industry Scope 41.9238 42.0074 33.0551 32.9427 31.2299 31.1868 
 (9.8228)** (9.7435)** (45.4478) (45.4448) (6.6245)** (6.5884)** 
AAA-10yr -5.7368 -5.7052 -1.0585 -1.0433 -0.7143 -0.7277 
 (17.9076) (17.9065) (1.4751) (1.4752) (1.3840) (1.4081) 
Firms in Ind 8.1363 8.2833 7.5838 7.4435 3.1001 3.0638 
 (15.5999) (15.5710) (7.1678) (7.1638) (14.9601) (14.9569) 
Sales Ind -15.1009 -15.3709 -26.5443 -24.4362 -7.5345 -7.8606 
 (18.1082) (18.1200) (33.7750) (33.7466) (17.9743) (18.0695) 
Mkt-rf 57.8330 57.5723 9.5252 9.4489 9.1357 9.0077 
 (130.6754) (130.6668) (24.7802) (24.7786) (11.7928) (12.0033) 
Stock Vol -0.3872 -0.3824 -0.5067 -0.5245 -0.4147 -0.4069 
 (0.6198) (0.6185) (2.6956) (2.6952) (2.4604) (2.4599) 
GDP Growth 20.9392 20.7411 13.3614 13.3119 25.0789 25.0259 
 (98.2229) (98.2158) (39.2836) (39.2811) (28.4720) (28.9625) 
Invest Growth 44.4099 44.1250 9.5252 9.3792 11.0766 11.0392 
 (147.8536) (147.8443) (24.7802) (23.9481) (9.3815) (9.5472) 
Earn AR Disp -10.1235 -10.6881 -10.7198 -10.7365 3.9912 4.7509 
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 (17.9118) (11.8980) (23.8671) (24.8668) (65.2616) (66.3100) 
Analyst Disp 82.9681 82.8250 34.9559 34.9704 55.0323 54.4554 
 (72.5327) (72.5170) (36.9630) (36.9625) (41.1246) (41.7830) 
Constant 0.2725 0.2569 0.4427 1.1870   
 (0.2391) (0.2401) (1.1034) (1.4516)   
LRChi2 218.62 219.89   102.17 103.51 
Adj. R2   0.51 0.51   
Observations 4572 4572 4572 4572 4572 4572 
Number of I-O 127 127 127 127 127 127 
VIF       
Degree 1.1964      
Eigenvector  1.1913     
 
Panel B) Importance of Different Factors 
The table reports the variation in IPOwave explained by each factor. Each row reports the logit regression of 
IPOwave and only one factor. The first row reports the estimates from the logit regression of IPOwave and Degree. 
Column (1) reports the odds ratio of the regression, Column (2) reports the z-statistics from the logit regression, 
Column (3) reports the Wald Chi2, and Column (4) reports the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) of the 
regression.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.: Odds ratio z-stat Chi2 BIC 
Degree 12.8313 7.31** 53.47 2225.615 
Eigenvector 19.8023 7.43** 55.19 2223.591 
FF4F Alpha  4.1618 2.03* 4.14 2318.316 
Sretx  4.3428 3.18** 10.08 2311.561 
MB  1.0001 0.03 0.00 2322.416 
Profit  112.2704 3.84** 14.78 2306.686 
Leverage  1.0401 1.45 2.12 2320.258 
Tang  0.4497 0.53 0.29 2322.129 
Capx  163.0701 6.18** 38.20 2289.190 
Size  0.6720 -5.73** 32.79 2286.767 
Hot  1.7846 3.52** 12.41 2311.106 
Herfindahl 0.6252 -2.00* 3.99 2318.485 
Industry Homogeneity 1.0052 0.30 0.09 2322.304 
Industry Scope 22.3251 5.41** 29.26 2292.538 
AAA-10yr 0.5274 -4.74** 22.47 2298.646 
Firms in Ind 1.0010 0.72 0.52 2321.851 
Sales Ind 0.0001 -1.16 1.34 2320.604 
Mkt-rf 1.0121 3.21** 10.28 2266.283 
Stock Vol 0.8265 -2.04* 4.15 2269.817 
GDP Growth 10.601 3.88** 15.05 2262.094 
Invest Growth 1.7560 0.39 0.15 2276.52 
Earn AR Disp 0.0004 -1.45 2.12 2274.565 
Analyst Disp 1.9838 0.18 0.03 2276.641 
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Table 4: Robustness: The Results Hold for Non-Hot Period 
The observations for the years 1997 to 2000 are dropped. Dependent variable IPOwave is an indicator variable equal 
to  one that signifies IPO waves for an I-O industry. IPOnum is the number of IPOs in an IPO wave by I-O industry. 
Degree is a measure of centrality. Eigenvector is a measure of eigenvector centrality. The rest of the variables are 
defined in Panel C of Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) use fixed effects in a panel logit regression, columns (3) and (4) 
uses industry fixed effects in an OLS, and columns (5) and (6) use the Cox hazard model. Year dummies are 
included in all columns. Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. The * and ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var.: IPOwave IPOwave IPOnum IPOnum IPOwave IPOwave 
Degree 1.9541  6.1584  1.4989  
 (0.4411)**  (2.0707)**  (0.3921)**  
Eigenvector  2.3205  7.2207  1.784 
  (0.5080)**  (2.5507)**  (0.4583)** 
FF4F Alpha  1.8850 1.8824 3.3568 3.3131 0.7411 0.7414 
 (1.2434) (1.2457) (5.6473) (5.6467) (1.4972) (1.5122) 
Sretx  1.6844 1.6814 1.6227 1.6724 0.6955 0.6961 
 (0.8647) (0.8626) (4.4417) (4.4411) (0.5377) (0.5378) 
MB  0.0425 0.0433 2.2681 2.2854 0.0341 0.0349 
 (0.0387) (0.0386) (0.7936)** (0.7941)** (0.0417) (0.0415) 
Profit  0.9950 0.9232 0.7086 0.7620 2.3704 2.2914 
 (1.4605) (1.4525) (5.0401) (5.0404) (1.5834) (1.5801) 
Leverage  0.3807 0.4147 1.0665 1.0329 1.6193 1.6343 
 (1.4152) (1.4137) (4.2507) (4.2495) (1.4496) (1.4513) 
Tang  -0.5028 -0.4877 -10.2991 -10.3093 -0.4202 -0.4198 
 (0.8945) (0.8919) (5.0108)* (5.0096)* (0.8581) (0.8588) 
Capx  4.7605 4.7617 0.4516 0.4290 3.0863 3.1018 
 (1.2421)** (1.2422)** (4.1770) (4.1771) (1.2206)* (1.2228)* 
Size  -0.0552 -0.0549 -0.0581 -0.0524 -0.0676 -0.0661 
 (0.0968) (0.0965) (0.3992) (0.3995) (0.0920) (0.0920) 
Herfindahl -0.7985 -0.7699 -0.5354 -0.5754 -0.6598 -0.6407 
 (0.3245)* (0.3237)* (1.0470) (1.0465) (0.3983) (0.3984) 
Industry  0.0369 0.0368 0.0082 0.0083 0.0665 0.0666 
Homogeneity (0.0424) (0.0426) (0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0925) (0.0928) 
Industry Scope 45.4965 45.6216 34.0591 33.9583 29.0895 29.1372 
 (11.2077)** (11.1146)** (45.9485) (45.3856) (6.9962)** (6.9495)** 
AAA-10yr -2.9864 -2.9801 -0.5684 -0.5608 -0.7014 -0.7127 
 (5.0799) (5.0799) (1.3146) (1.3148) (1.8867) (1.9136) 
Firms in Ind 0.7871 0.6551 109.6484 109.2130 0.9653 0.9550 
 (18.6316) (18.6039) (140.9199) (140.9174) (17.8960) (17.8994) 
Sales Ind -41.3750 -42.6958 -220.3618 -219.9317 -39.8189 -41.2561 
 (35.1114) (35.3427) (317.4169) (317.4020) (37.5068) (37.9438) 
Mkt-rf 48.1991 47.9654 10.0494 10.2481 11.0036 10.9300 
 (116.9823) (116.9802) (14.4853) (18.8473) (15.9022) (16.1467) 
Stock Vol -0.6529 -0.6503 -0.7675 -0.7843 27.6723 27.6847 
 (0.6017) (0.6000) (2.4962) (2.4959) (31.9018) (32.3893) 
GDP Growth 34.4272 34.1835 14.3875 17.4958 16.7481 16.7133 
 (145.8745) (145.8750) (28.5529) (19.4832) (17.0853) (17.2927) 
Invest Growth 2.0535 2.1421 2.5958 3.5947 3.3728 4.3183 
 (3.1964) (3.1964) (4.4382) (4.9811) (5.6245) (7.0852) 
Earn AR Disp -44.0831 -43.3377 -12.8274 -11.4621 -16.8946 -16.3850 
 (302.1870) (302.1801) (13.3651) (14.3852) (86.3138) (87.4971) 
Analyst Disp 32.8391 32.3795 26.8371 23.4681 11.0036 10.9300 
 (94.3119) (94.3054) (19.8472) (17.8437) (15.9022) (16.1467) 
Constant 0.5314 0.5170 5.0080 6.3947   
 (0.2470)* (0.2479)* (4.9586) (5.2686)   
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LRChi2 184.53 185.43   85.88 86.66 
Adj. R2   0.52 0.52   
Observations 3872 3872 3872 3872 3872 3872 
Number of I-O 121 121 121 121 121 121 
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Table 5:  Deregulatory Shocks and IPO Waves 
Panel A) IPO Waves Before and After Industry Deregulations 
The sample consists of industries that experience deregulatory shocks. Of these industries all industries with a 
Degree value greater than the 75 percentile are included and coded as High Degree = 1. Also, of the shocked 
industries, all industries with Eigenvector value greater than the 75th percentile are included and coded as High 
Eigen = 1. The rest of the industries are propensity score matched industries. The matching variables are size, year 
and profitability of the industry.  The time period is five years before and five years after the shock. Shock is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the observation-years are after an industry shock. There are 120 
observations. Standard errors are robust. The * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Before Deregulations After Deregulations Diff-in-Diff 
 Control Treated (2)-(1) Control Treated (5)-(4) (6)-(3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Analysis Using High Degree 
IPOwave 0.021 0.012 -0.009** 0.062 0.107 0.045** 0.054** 
IPOnum 0.464 0.001 -0.463** 2.116 3.269 1.153** 1.617** 
 Analysis Using High Eigen 
IPOwave 0.019 0.009 -0.010** 0.051 0.097 0.047** 0.057** 
IPOnum 0.474 0.004 -0.470** 1.706 2.869 1.163** 1.633** 
 
Panel B) Diff-in-Diff Analysis 
The sample consists of industries that experience deregulatory shocks. All industries with a Degree value greater 
than the 75 percentile are included and coded as HighDegree = 1. All industries with an Eigenvector value greater 
than the 75th percentile are included and coded as HighEigen = 1. The rest of the industries are propensity score 
matched industries. The matching variables are size, year, and profitability of the industry.  The time period is five 
years before and five years after the shock. Shock is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the observation 
years are after an industry shock. HighDegree * Shock is the interaction term of HighDegree and Shock. HighEigen 
* Shock is the interaction term of HighEigen and Shock. The rest of the variables are as defined in Table 2. Columns 
(1) and (2) use fixed effects in the logit regressions and column (3) and (4) use industry fixed effects in an OLS. 
Year dummies are included, but not reported. Standard errors are robust. The * and ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.: IPOwave IPOwave IPOnum IPOnum 
HighDegree 0.9224  1.4752  
 (0.2813)**  (1.1835)  
HighDegree*Shock 0.3995  1.2799  
 (0.0556)**  (0.0532)**  
HighEigen  0.6194  0.8472 
  (0.2644)*  (0.2741)** 
HighEigen*Shock  0.4474  1.2910 
  (0.0555)**  (0.0533)** 
Shock -0.0743 -0.1032 -0.3083 -0.3266 
 (0.0430) (0.0422)* (0.0397)** (0.0401)** 
FF4F Alpha 1.2691 1.3338 0.0067 0.0066 
 (0.8800) (0.8706) (0.0300) (0.0300) 
Sretx 0.7437 0.7317 0.6646 0.6351 
 (0.5587) (0.5604) (0.4148) (0.4146) 
MB 0.0313 0.0311 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (0.0323) (0.0325) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
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Profit 2.9739 2.8150 0.0008 0.0007 
 (2.2301) (2.2254) (0.0118) (0.0118) 
Leverage 0.2004 0.3172 0.3559 0.3220 
 (1.1430) (1.1404) (0.5599) (0.5597) 
Tang -0.3532 -0.3282 -0.3181 -0.2214 
 (0.7611) (0.7638) (0.5931) (0.5929) 
Capx 3.5033 3.6258 1.3821 1.3932 
 (2.9595) (0.9597)** (0.6241)* (0.6238)* 
Size -0.2567 -0.2451 -0.1727 -0.1741 
 (0.1813) (0.2817) (0.1466) (0.1466) 
Hot 0.2674 0.2260 0.2976 0.2808 
 (0.2613) (0.2630) (0.1404)* (0.1403)* 
Herfindahl -0.4087 -0.4050 -0.7871 -0.7799 
 (0.2707) (0.2716) (0.6884) (0.7884) 
Industry Homogeneity 0.0167 0.0175 0.0005 0.0006 
 (0.0272) (0.0279) (0.0087) (0.0087) 
Industry Scope 41.6680 45.1950 64.9483 61.0494 
 (9.9919)** (9.9969)** (23.1749)** (25.8571)* 
AAA-10yr -1.0216 -1.0345 -0.2302 -0.2355 
 (1.3026) (1.3035) (0.2088) (0.2088) 
Firms in Ind 8.4175 9.8562 3.3929 3.4149 
 (14.6845) (14.5937) (10.3416) (10.3372) 
Sales Ind -15.8554 -17.2869 -10.4982 -10.5439 
 (17.2820) (17.3092) (15.8844) (15.8777) 
Mkt-rf 5.0404 5.1361 0.9229 0.9428 
 (2.4974)* (2.5023)* (1.1128) (1.1124) 
Stock Vol -8.8578 -8.9391 -5.8857 -5.9121 
 (14.6453) (14.6763) (4.0406) (4.0397) 
GDP Growth 2.6838 12.6650 2.9886 2.9902 
 (2.1465) (12.1534) (2.6738) (1.6735) 
Invest Growth 13.4977 13.3971 18.5187 18.4964 
 (12.0232) (12.0740) (13.5291) (13.5276) 
Earn AR Disp -25.0213 -24.6153 -3.6520 -3.4703 
 (17.1141) (17.1463) (2.6294) (2.6283) 
Analyst Disp 2.4155 2.2811 1.9485 1.6482 
 (1.3272) (1.3303) (1.6739) (1.8456) 
Constant 0.3032 0.3124 2.0764 2.1025 
 (0.2321) (0.2316) (0.5975)** (0.5973)** 
Chi2/ R2 132.47 140.43 48.76 45.76 
Observations 120 120 120 120 
Number of I-O 12 12 12 12 
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Table 6:  Downstream Shocks and Upstream IPO Waves 
The sample consists of industries that experience deregulatory shocks. Of these industries all with a Degree greater 
than the 75th percentile are included and coded as HighDegree = 1. Also, of the shocked industries all with an 
Eigenvector greater than the 75th percentile are included and coded as HighEigen = 1. The rest of the industries are 
propensity score matched. The matching variables are size, year, and profitability of the industry.  The dependent 
variable IPOWave1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if any upstream industry experiences an IPO 
wave in a year, or zero otherwise. IPOnum1 is the total number of IPOs experienced by the upstream industries in a 
year. The time period is five years before and five years after the shock. Shock is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the observation-years are after an industry shock. HighDegree* Shock is the interaction term of high 
Degree and Shock. HighEigen* Shock is the interaction term of high Eigenvector and Shock. The rest of the 
variables are as defined in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) use fixed effects in the logit regressions while column (3) 
and (4) use fixed effects in an OLS. Year dummies are included, but not reported. Standard errors are robust. The * 
and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.: IPOwave1 IPOwave1 IPOnum1 IPOnum1 
HighDegree 0.6636  0.3289  
 (0.2908)*  (0.2761)  
HighDegree*Shock 0.3117  0.3670  
 (0.0603)**  (0.0604)**  
HighEigen  0.6194  0.5837 
  (0.2644)*  (0.2183)** 
HighEigen*Shock  0.4474  1.2955 
  (0.0555)**  (0.0837)** 
Shock -0.0182 -0.0538 -0.3360 -0.3650 
 (0.0484) (0.0480) (0.3667) (0.3678) 
FF4F Alpha 1.1384 1.1786 0.7856 0.8218 
 (0.9265) (0.9173) (1.0036) (1.0031) 
Sretx 1.4270 1.4212 1.1646 1.1026 
 (1.5592) (1.5593) (0.7698) (0.7694) 
MB 0.1384 0.1306 0.0138 0.0110 
 (0.1613) (0.1613) (0.0436) (0.0436) 
Profit 3.5153 3.3175 0.3640 0.2954 
 (2.4330) (2.4317) (1.0451) (1.0447) 
Leverage 0.8912 1.0008 0.0332 0.0523 
 (1.3145) (1.3117) (1.2603) (1.2597) 
Tang -0.9620 -0.8951 -0.0921 -0.0874 
 (0.8563) (0.8595) (1.1893) (1.1888) 
Capx 3.9073 4.1288 2.9447 3.0237 
 (1.1831)** (1.1852)** (1.3141)* (1.3131)* 
Size -0.1673 -0.1501 -0.2345 -0.2376 
 (0.0904) (0.0908) (0.2075) (0.2074) 
Hot 0.2104 0.1506 0.6268 0.5849 
 (0.2953) (0.2973) (0.2804)* (0.2803)* 
Herfindahl -0.0203 -0.0135 -1.3137 -1.3118 
 (0.3099) (0.3109) (1.3709) (1.3707) 
Industry Homogeneity 0.0074 0.0081 0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.0280) (0.0295) (0.0156) (0.0155) 
Industry Scope 34.3992 38.0025 38.5832 31.9325 
 (10.2942)** (10.2838)** (20.4831) (18.3943) 
AAA-10yr -0.4103 -0.4180 -0.1363 -0.1504 
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 (0.4096) (0.4110) (0.2958) (0.2956) 
Firms in Ind 19.0807 20.1950 12.1166 12.4188 
 (18.8366) (18.6828) (24.4193) (24.4066) 
Sales Ind -23.9069 -25.5000 -6.4759 -6.8131 
 (21.2525) (21.2190) (32.0297) (32.0126) 
Mkt-rf 4.9538 4.8459 0.0129 -0.0038 
 (3.4191) (3.4317) (2.5146) (2.5132) 
Stock Vol -8.8472 -8.3821 -4.59382 -4.2921 
 (9.4827) (10.8314) (4.9382) (4.9328) 
GDP Growth 21.3257 21.4686 5.7459 6.0201 
 (7.8659)** (7.8635)** (6.0249) (6.0215) 
Invest Growth 6.2092 5.9819 10.0131 9.9904 
 (6.2238) (6.2357) (8.2579) (8.2567) 
Earn AR Disp -9.8890 -8.1063 -6.1913 -63.5048 
 (17.2228) (17.3182) (11.7140) (11.7090) 
Analyst Disp 26.1561 24.9299 22.8874 21.9404 
 (19.3553) (19.4187) (17.9343) (17.9311) 
Constant 0.2590 0.2636 5.5934 5.5449 
 (0.2689) (0.2679) (1.6821)** (1.6813)** 
Chi2/ R2 174.84 177.83 53.92 53.97 
Observations 120 120 120 120 
Number of I-O 12 12 12 12 
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Table 7: Free Trade Agreement and IPO Waves 
Panel A) IPO Waves Before and After NAFTA 
The dependent variable IPOwave is an indicator variable equal to one that signifies an IPO wave for the I-O 
industry. Of these industries all with a Degree greater than the 75 percentile are included and coded as HighDegree1 
= 1. Also, of the shocked industries all with an Eigenvector greater than the 75th percentile are included and coded as 
HighEigen1 = 1. The rest of the industries are propensity score matched. The matching variables are size, year, and 
profitability of the industry.  The time period is from 1986 to 1991. The table contains 372 observations. The * and 
** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Before NAFTA After NAFTA Diff-in-Diff 
 Control Treated (2)-(1) Control Treated (5)-(4) (6)-(3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Analysis Using HighDegree 
IPOwave 0.012 0.033 0.021 0.136 0.014 -0.122** -0.143** 
IPOnum 0.430 0.581 0.151 3.243 1.587 -1.655** -1.806** 
 Analysis Using HighEigen 
IPOwave 0.013 0.033 0.021 0.112 0.011 -0.101** -0.122** 
IPOnum 0.433 0.586 0.153 2.642 1.314 -1.329** -1.482** 
 
 
Panel B) IPO Waves 
The dependent variable IPOwave is an indicator variable equal to one that signifies an IPO wave for the I-O 
industry. Of these industries all with a Degree greater than the 75 percentile are included and coded as HighDegree1 
= 1. Also, of the shocked industries all with an Eigenvector greater than the 75th percentile are included and coded 
as HighEigen1 = 1. The rest of the industries are propensity score matched. The matching variables are size, year, 
and profitability of the industry. The time period is from 1986 to 1991. HighDegree1* Post-FTA is the interaction 
term of high Degree and Shock. HighEigen1* Post-FTA is the interaction term of high Eigenvector and Shock. The 
rest of the variables are as defined in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) use industry fixed effects in the logit regressions 
while column (3) and (4) use industry fixed effects in an OLS. Year dummies are included, but not reported. 
Standard errors are robust. The * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.: IPOwave IPOwave IPOnum IPOnum 
HighDegree1 1.2247  0.8699  
 (0.6125)*  (0.3821)*  
HighDegree1* Post-FTA -2.1796  -2.1882  
 (1.0536)*  (1.0490)*  
HighEigen1  0.6583  0.8637 
  (0.2557)*  (0.2612)** 
HighEigen1* Post-FTA  -0.4474  -1.1311 
  (0.0555)**  (0.2755)** 
Post-FTA -0.1521 -0.1081 -0.9917 -0.9985 
 (3.3333) (3.3424) (0.6381) (0.6406) 
FF4F Alpha 3.5145 3.4338 1.3381 1.3721 
 (3.5680) (3.5976) (1.3787) (1.3827) 
Sretx 1.4533 1.4174 0.5050 0.5034 
 (1.6351) (1.6428) (0.7960) (0.7981) 
MB 0.4876 0.4952 0.0675 0.0746 
 (0.4450) (0.4476) (0.3359) (0.3368) 
Profit 4.1746 4.2014 1.1809 0.9696 
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 (3.7056) (3.7112) (2.2561) (2.2625) 
Leverage 3.1881 3.4673 0.7184 0.7370 
 (3.4460) (3.4497) (1.4281) (1.4319) 
Tang -1.4721 -1.2423 -0.4611 -0.2530 
 (1.8308) (1.8247) (1.5340) (1.5400) 
Capx 4.7292 4.6982 0.7537 0.5940 
 (2.4898) (2.5076) (1.2596) (1.2634) 
Size -0.0795 -0.0962 -0.0461 -0.0353 
 (0.1907) (0.1911) (0.1739) (0.1746) 
Herfindahl -0.1493 -0.0956 -0.1953 -0.3380 
 (0.7972) (0.7999) (0.5150) (0.5149) 
Industry Homogeneity 0.1109 0.1149 0.0056 0.0054 
 (0.1400) (0.1409) (0.0188) (0.0188) 
Industry Scope 68.0861 72.3825 54.8774 61.0494 
 (19.4253)** (19.5237)** (23.1749)** (25.8571)* 
AAA-10yr -0.2763 -0.3322 -1.8402 -1.8473 
 (5.5637) (5.5799) (0.9660) (0.9686) 
Firms in Ind 11.7291 9.0673 2.8824 2.1135 
 (30.0397) (9.9014) (2.0990) (2.2402) 
Sales Ind -4.7159 -6.9721 -18.4595 -19.3822 
 (37.6616) (37.7348) (77.0903) (77.2949) 
Mkt-rf 25.0622 25.3417 0.3249 0.3067 
 (29.4258) (29.5394) (5.0464) (5.0599) 
Stock Vol -9.4382 -10.4761 -9.4721 -0.8372 
 (10.3852) (0.9487) (0.8462) (0.9472) 
GDP Growth 29.8978 30.3384 16.3162 16.2481 
 (35.7862) (35.8767) (10.0963) (10.1233) 
Invest Growth 30.8691 30.8486 5.3010 5.3115 
 (16.3405) (16.3709) (3.6973) (3.7072) 
Earn AR Disp -25.0213 -24.6153 -3.6520 -3.4703 
 (17.1141) (17.1463) (2.6294) (2.6283) 
Analyst Disp 2.4155 2.2811 1.9485 1.6482 
 (1.3272) (1.3303) (1.6739) (1.8456) 
Constant 1.1631 1.1913 4.2591 4.0587 
 (0.4212)** (0.4174)** (2.4472) (2.4550) 
Chi2/ R2 18.06 20.41 0.67 0.67 
Observations 372 372 317 317 
Number of I-O 62 62 124 124 
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Table 8: IPO Waves and Customer IPOs 
Panel A) Upstream IPO Waves 
The dependent variable IPOwave in columns (1)-(2) is an indicator variable equal to one that signifies an IPO wave 
for the I-O industry. The dependent variable IPOnum in columns (3)-(4) is the number of IPOs in the year for the I-
O industry. Odd numbered columns are ones with customers with an IPO wave, even columns have customers 
without IPO wave. The variables are as defined in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) use fixed effects in the logit 
regressions and column (3) and (4) use industry fixed effects in an OLS. Standard errors are robust. Year dummies 
are used but not reported. The * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Customer     
IPO Wave? Yes No Yes No 
Dep. Var.: IPOwave IPOwave IPOnum IPOnum 
Degree 2.1007 0.0259 2.0899 0.0430 
 (0.4131)** (1.2039) (0.9834)* (0.3347) 
FF4F Alpha  1.3300 1.9506 1.1717 0.0017 
 (0.8972) (3.4030) (1.1388) (0.0107) 
Sretx  1.4536 0.4714 1.3586 0.0374 
 (0.5545)** (1.7947) (0.8485) (0.2246) 
MB  0.1312 0.0212 0.0104 0.0004 
 (0.0604)* (0.0380) (0.0473) (0.0011) 
Profit  3.2932 1.1250 0.2005 0.0003 
 (1.4434)* (1.6337) (1.1446) (0.0042) 
Leverage  0.5753 1.8087 1.1400 0.3014 
 (1.3329) (2.5242) (1.3881) (0.2539) 
Tang  -0.9038 -1.0483 -0.6291 -0.1913 
 (0.8834) (1.6175) (1.3132) (0.2964) 
Capx  5.0269 2.1664 4.7169 0.3011 
 (1.1843)** (2.1457) (1.4565)** (0.2922) 
Size  -0.1137 -0.2910 -0.1331 -0.0736 
 (0.0926) (0.1691) (0.1202) (0.0214)** 
Hot  0.2869 0.5786 0.7917 0.0585 
 (0.2870) (0.6508) (0.2991)** (0.0733) 
Herfindahl -0.2081 -0.3821 -0.0274 -0.0382 
 (0.2778) (0.6372) (0.0392) (0.0843) 
Industry Homogeneity 0.0015 0.0085 0.0134 0.0134 
 (0.0172) (0.0812) (0.0809) (0.0193) 
Industry Scope 37.1683 70.1274 146.8674 37.2970 
 (9.0511)** (37.9292) (33.7575)** (8.0022)** 
AAA-10yr -0.4696 -1.8031 -0.3732 -0.1010 
 (0.2122)* (1.0302) (0.1289)** (0.0364)** 
Firms in Ind 4.9858 4.7601 0.2284 1.0722 
 (9.9109) (4.3538) (9.9411) (4.8762) 
Sales Ind -20.0452 -20.5773 -6.0755 -4.1006 
 (22.2859) (44.1236) (34.7904) (7.4686) 
Mkt-rf 6.2553 12.2258 1.8132 1.0259 
 (3.2932) (4.8753)* (2.7933) (0.5228)* 
Stock Vol -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)* (0.0000) 
GDP Growth 20.7930 9.9028 3.9454 0.8952 
59 
 
 (7.9211)** (8.3036) (6.4839) (0.9431) 
Invest Growth 16.9085 7.2629 10.8228 0.7944 
 (3.1175)** (3.1075)* (2.1290)** (0.3006)** 
Earn AR Disp -103.7321 -33.1711 -77.0428 -5.7238 
 (16.7068)** (17.8752) (12.8623)** (1.6158)** 
Analyst Disp 23.0308 29.4759 24.0627 2.5102 
 (8.7909)** (11.9658)* (8.3773)** (0.9940)* 
Constant 0.4507 0.9238 6.6942 1.2073 
 (0.2570) (0.4130)* (1.9014)** (0.2862)** 
Chi2/ R2 103.6 26.17 0.53 0.43 
Observations 1944 2628 1944 2628 
Number of I-O 54 73 54 73 
 
  
Panel B) Downstream IPO Waves 
The dependent variable IPOwave in columns (1)-(2) is an indicator variable equal to one that signifies an IPO wave 
for the I-O industry. The dependent variable IPOnum in columns (3)-(4) is the number of IPOs in the year for the I-
O industry. Odd numbered columns are ones with customers with an IPO wave, even columns have customers 
without IPO wave. The variables are as defined in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) use fixed effects in the logit 
regressions and column (3) and (4) use industry fixed effects in an OLS. Standard errors are robust. Year dummies 
are used but not reported. The * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Supplier     
IPO Wave? Yes No Yes No 
Dep. Var.: IPOwave IPOwave IPOnum IPOnum 
Degree 1.5869 1.4577 0.7338 0.6519 
 (0.5788)** (0.5109)** (0.2253)** (0.2432)** 
FF4F Alpha  1.2031 2.2385 0.8617 0.0026 
 (0.9126) (9.8295) (0.7078) (0.0080) 
Sretx  1.0478 3.6932 1.0770 0.5621 
 (0.5111)* (6.7047) (0.5538) (0.2393)* 
MB  0.0282 0.4742 0.0083 0.0005 
 (0.0334) (1.2916) (0.0214) (0.0008) 
Profit  1.9405 10.4438 0.2150 0.0005 
 (1.2713) (9.8871) (0.5574) (0.0031) 
Leverage  0.3750 4.6067 0.9488 0.0071 
 (1.1914) (6.6532) (0.8129) (0.2491) 
Tang  -0.4651 -1.0702 -0.5499 -0.0816 
 (0.8072) (3.8179) (0.8227) (0.2924) 
Capx  5.0426 4.3257 2.8151 0.0122 
 (1.0542)** (7.8717) (0.8931)** (0.2858) 
Size  -0.1844 -0.0807 -0.1510 -0.0977 
 (0.0838)* (0.4667) (0.0696)* (0.0207)** 
Hot  0.1302 0.0937 0.2040 0.0056 
 (0.2806) (0.3615) (0.2014) (0.8447) 
Herfindahl -0.4564 -0.3762 -0.0382 -0.0284 
 (0.2533) (0.5327) (0.0429) (0.0395) 
Industry Homogeneity 0.0104 0.0094 0.0125 0.0174 
 (0.0252) (0.0074) (0.0385) (0.0284) 
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Industry Scope 37.1683 42.9481 76.9312 32.9481 
 (9.0511)** (43.9581) (32.4981)* (14.9382)* 
AAA-10yr -0.4696 -1.8031 -0.3732 -0.1010 
 (0.2122)* (1.0302) (0.1289)** (0.0364)** 
Firms in Ind 1.0716 35.1220 0.3556 0.8033 
 (15.6665) (175.9670) (15.9276) (4.7910) 
Sales Ind -10.9631 -292.4801 -10.3429 -3.6807 
 (18.7254) (480.1035) (21.2059) (8.3972) 
Mkt-rf 3.7811 31.2748 2.2134 0.6025 
 (2.7683) (40.8265) (1.6364) (0.5749) 
Stock Vol -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)* (0.0000) 
GDP Growth 10.0413 136.6970 2.5710 3.0786 
 (6.9147) (120.6815) (3.7812) (0.9339)** 
Invest Growth 5.0005 1.0305 6.8376 0.7207 
 (2.8349)** (8.2469) (1.2435)** (0.2845)* 
Earn AR Disp -4.9590 -11.8500 -46.3929 -0.3884 
 (5.1245) (9.0075) (7.3989)** (1.5710) 
Analyst Disp 17.6038 28.9164 6.1042 1.0260 
 (8.5549)* (65.6870) (5.3910) (0.8365) 
Constant 0.4489 1.4371 4.1356 0.5820 
 (0.2220)* (1.0440) (1.0794)** (0.2822)* 
Chi2/ R2 151.9 39.7 0.57 0.43 
Observations 3154 1418 3154 1418 
Number of I-O 88 39 88 39 
 
 
  
Panel C: Upstream Industry Centrality and Propagation of IPO Waves 
The sample consists of industries whose customer’s industry experiences an IPO wave. Odd numbered columns are 
supplier industries with a Degree greater than the median, even numbered columns have supplier industries with a 
Degree less than the median. The dependent variable IPOwave in columns (1)-(2) is an indicator variable equal to 
one that signifies an IPO wave in the I-O industry. The dependent variable IPOnum in columns (3)-(4) is the number 
of IPOs in the year in the I-O industry. The variables are as defined in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) use industry 
fixed effects in the logit regressions while column (3) and (4) use industry fixed effects in an OLS. Standard errors 
are robust. Year dummies are used but not reported. The * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Degree>Median Yes No Yes No 
Dep. Var.: IPOwave IPOwave IPOnum IPOnum 
Degree 0.1321 0.0261 0.8950 -0.3103 
 (0.0441)** (0.0160) (0.3458)** (3.0656) 
FF4F Alpha  0.0005 0.1446 0.0041 1.1578 
 (0.0001)** (0.1322) (0.0170) (3.9226) 
Sretx  0.0484 0.1558 0.1786 3.4796 
 (0.0212)* (0.1250) (0.2599) (3.0430) 
MB  0.0001 0.0162 0.0004 1.2082 
 (0.0001) (0.0195) (0.0017) (0.5143)* 
Profit  0.0000 0.0937 0.0003 0.8183 
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 (0.0001) (0.0933) (0.0068) (3.5386) 
Leverage  0.0181 0.0008 0.7455 2.3592 
 (0.0236) (0.1058) (0.3426)* (3.8233) 
Tang  -0.0186 -0.0314 -0.2376 -0.7363 
 (0.0199) (0.0668) (0.3825) (3.3822) 
Capx  0.0997 0.1713 0.0515 10.3407 
 (0.0339)** (0.1257) (0.4008) (3.4695)** 
Size  -0.0040 -0.0009 -0.1057 -0.0128 
 (0.0017)* (0.0103) (0.0299)** (0.2827) 
Hot  0.0007 0.0562 0.0426 1.9779 
 (0.0082) (0.0333) (0.0892) (0.7701)* 
Herfindahl -0.0069 -0.0095 -0.5923 -0.8951 
 (0.0079) (0.0272) (0.1361)** (0.8427) 
Industry Homogeneity 0.0002 0.0002 0.0019 0.0035 
 (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0069) (0.0277) 
Industry Scope 3.3417 1.7296 5.7361 5.8371 
 (1.0491)** (0.4644)** (4.9281) (8.4921) 
AAA-10yr -0.0102 -0.0023 -0.1787 -0.3901 
 (0.0042)* (0.0141) (0.0715)* (0.6191) 
Firms in Ind 0.1051 0.1740 0.7306 18.0104 
 (0.2185) (0.5171) (6.3214) (229.6443) 
Sales Ind -0.1361 -0.6358 -5.9800 -30.9469 
 (0.1740) (1.7418) (9.2052) (522.3836) 
Mkt-rf 0.0320 0.1735 0.0420 3.3791 
 (0.0555) (0.2346) (0.7169) (6.2341) 
Stock Vol -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)** (0.0000)* 
GDP Growth 0.1422 1.0521 2.3377 19.5916 
 (0.0850) (0.4283)* (1.3742) (11.9919) 
Invest Growth 0.0754 0.3743 1.2922 9.9597 
 (0.0279)** (0.1322)** (0.4364)** (3.8906)* 
Earn AR Disp -0.6052 -1.4419 -10.5339 -43.0918 
 (0.1998)** (0.7935) (2.3370)** (20.3577)* 
Analyst Disp 0.0887 0.9121 0.6953 18.2600 
 (0.0920) (0.3685)* (1.7049) (14.9846) 
Constant 0.0428 0.0227 1.0385 1.8170 
 (0.0203)* (0.0880) (0.4033)* (15.8590) 
Chi2/ R2 38.29 31.17 0.57 0.53 
Observations 972 972 972 972 
Number of I-O 27 27 27 27 
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Panel D: Downstream Industry Centrality and Propagation of IPO Waves 
The sample consists of industries whose customer’s industry experiences an IPO wave. Odd numbered columns are 
supplier industries with a Degree greater than the median, even numbered columns have supplier industries with a 
Degree less than the median. The dependent variable IPOwave in columns (1)-(2) is an indicator variable equal to 
one that signifies an IPO wave in the I-O industry. The dependent variable IPOnum in columns (3)-(4) is the number 
of IPOs in the year in the I-O industry. The variables are as defined in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) use industry 
fixed effects in the logit regressions while column (3) and (4) use industry fixed effects in an OLS. Standard errors 
are robust. Year dummies are used but not reported. The * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Degree>Median Yes No Yes No 
Dep. Var.: IPOwave IPOwave IPOnum IPOnum 
Degree 0.0586 -0.1070 1.3158 -2.3001 
 (0.0493) (0.1408) (0.9816) (1.1207)* 
FF4F Alpha  0.0452 0.0003 0.2661 0.0004 
 (0.0375) (0.0001)* (1.1613) (0.0112) 
Sretx  0.0811 0.0177 1.0982 0.0557 
 (0.0417) (0.0189) (0.8149) (0.2628) 
MB  0.0349 0.0000 1.0884 0.0005 
 (0.0153)* (0.0000)* (0.2441)** (0.0011) 
Profit  0.0566 0.0001 0.9879 0.0003 
 (0.0642) (0.0000)* (1.5810) (0.0045) 
Leverage  0.0293 0.0280 0.6289 0.1226 
 (0.0457) (0.0279) (1.2319) (0.2945) 
Tang  -0.0370 -0.0129 -0.7275 0.4141 
 (0.0374) (0.0184) (1.3214) (0.3223) 
Capx  0.1395 0.0654 2.6689 0.5502 
 (0.0652)* (0.0390) (1.4222) (0.3313) 
Size  -0.0045 -0.0028 -0.2391 -0.1019 
 (0.0040) (0.0016) (0.1119)* (0.0253)** 
Hot  0.0176 0.0065 0.8453 0.0179 
 (0.0160) (0.0085) (0.2979)** (0.0751) 
Herfindahl -0.0216 -0.0104 -1.2376 -0.0888 
 (0.0133) (0.0107) (0.3552)** (0.1506) 
Industry Homogeneity 0.0003 0.0000 0.0010 0.0014 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0148) (0.0063) 
Industry Scope 2.1234 3.1762 3.8284 4.9281 
 (0.6485)** (0.7463)** (2.9841) (4.0962) 
AAA-10yr -0.0081 -0.0079 -0.2777 -0.1708 
 (0.0074) (0.0050) (0.2376) (0.0636)** 
Firms in Ind 0.1669 0.0546 9.7378 -1.0873 
 (0.4782) (0.1492) (36.1205) (4.5905) 
Sales Ind -0.1043 -0.1471 -43.7814 -0.1462 
 (0.3803) (0.1290) (62.3101) (7.6003) 
Mkt-rf 0.1167 0.0131 1.0379 0.6256 
 (0.0934) (0.0717) (2.3056) (0.6315) 
Stock Vol -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)* (0.0000)** 
GDP Growth 0.5088 0.0377 8.4544 1.0889 
 (0.1694)** (0.0976) (4.2272)* (1.2852) 
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Invest Growth 0.2409 0.0315 5.9335 0.4572 
 (0.0562)** (0.0346) (1.4640)** (0.3839) 
Earn AR Disp -1.2464 -0.4271 -29.1293 -3.4681 
 (0.3461)** (0.2178) (7.9174)** (2.1402) 
Analyst Disp 0.4124 0.1204 8.8693 0.6747 
 (0.1639)* (0.1083) (5.5702) (1.4954) 
Constant 0.0234 0.0374 1.8820 1.5468 
 (0.0363) (0.0216) (1.8001) (0.4233)** 
Chi2/ R2 307.61 110.01 0.43 0.38 
Observations 1577 1577 1577 1577 
Number of I-O 44 44 44 44 
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Table 9: Speed with which IPO Waves Move Upstream 
The sample consists of industries whose customer’s industry experiences an IPO wave. Odd numbered columns are 
supplier industries with a Degree greater than the median, even numbered columns have supplier industries with a 
Degree less than the median. The dependent variable IPOwave in columns (1)-(2) is an indicator variable equal to 
one that signifies an IPO wave in the I-O industry. The dependent variable IPOnum in columns (3)-(4) is the number 
of IPOs in the year in the I-O industry. The variables are as defined in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) use industry 
fixed effects in the logit regressions while column (3) and (4) use industry fixed effects in an OLS. Standard errors 
are robust. Year dummies are used but not reported. The * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Degree>Median Yes No Yes No 
Dep. Var.: IPOwave IPOwave IPOnum IPOnum 
Time 0.6232 0.1727 2.7341 1.0611 
 (0.0252)** (0.3390) (0.4367)** (0.6258) 
Time*Time -0.1411 0.0933 -0.4981 0.2054 
 (0.0095)** (0.0816) (0.0684)** (0.1450) 
FF4F Alpha  0.0003 0.0049 0.0037 0.3365 
 (0.0001)** (0.0472) (0.0152) (2.8553) 
Sretx  0.0436 0.0631 0.2889 0.8926 
 (0.0158)** (0.0508) (0.2287) (2.2311) 
MB  0.0000 0.0046 0.0003 0.1460 
 (0.0000) (0.0082) (0.0015) (0.4029) 
Profit  0.0000 0.0570 0.0004 0.4735 
 (0.0000) (0.0428) (0.0060) (2.7574) 
Leverage  0.0078 0.0541 0.7437 4.9143 
 (0.0146) (0.0533) (0.3018)* (2.9807) 
Tang  -0.0044 -0.0188 -0.2505 -0.3626 
 (0.0123) (0.0245) (0.3372) (2.6441) 
Capx  0.0790 0.0944 0.2734 2.4583 
 (0.0290)** (0.0606) (0.3495) (2.7205) 
Size  -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0782 -0.3741 
 (0.0012) (0.0038) (0.0260)** (0.2192) 
Hot  0.0096 0.0265 0.0693 0.8213 
 (0.0065) (0.0218) (0.0785) (0.5949) 
Herfindahl -0.0081 -0.0075 -0.4098 -0.2655 
 (0.0055) (0.0168) (0.1199)** (0.6499) 
Industry Homogeneity 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0067 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0061) (0.0218) 
Industry Scope 1.4300 0.8140 5.8825 6.0444 
 (0.5036)** (0.1071)** (5.3515) (10.1585) 
AAA-10yr -0.0036 -0.0030 -0.1509 -0.1541 
 (0.0032) (0.0095) (0.0612)* (0.4645) 
Firms in Ind 0.0364 0.4452 5.8889 4.9116 
 (0.1691) (0.3005) (5.3464) (180.2271) 
Sales Ind -0.0173 -1.6190 -6.0995 -75.0238 
 (0.1277) (0.7659)* (8.1524) (409.9471) 
Mkt-rf 0.0102 0.1533 0.4586 2.2313 
 (0.0391) (0.1485) (0.6202) (4.6981) 
Stock Vol -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)** (0.0000) 
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GDP Growth 0.0842 0.5166 1.8195 8.9179 
 (0.0414)* (0.2088)* (1.1724) (8.8639) 
Invest Growth 0.0576 0.2463 1.1751 6.0711 
 (0.0201)** (0.0941)* (0.3781)** (2.9424)* 
Earn AR Disp -0.2850 -0.5793 -7.7442 -38.1004 
 (0.1246)* (0.3385) (1.9905)** (15.2363)* 
Analyst Disp 0.1267 0.4181 0.1239 5.0167 
 (0.0778) (0.2688) (1.4821) (11.3437) 
Constant 0.0270 0.0733 0.9082 5.9254 
 (0.0131)* (0.0360)* (0.3354)** (12.2674) 
Chi2/ R2 38.29 31.17 0.57 0.53 
Observations 972 972 972 972 
Number of I-O 27 27 27 27 
 
 
